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1209 
REGULATING THE SALE OF STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET 
DATA TO HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADERS 
Jerry W. Markham* 
Abstract 
In 2014, author Michael Lewis published a bestselling book titled 
Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt, in which he argued that “high-
frequency traders” have been able to gain an unfair advantage in the stock 
market, in part because stock exchanges and “dark pools”—alternative 
venues for trading stocks—have enabled those traders to obtain and trade 
on market data faster than other investors. A litany of lawsuits followed 
in short succession, asserting various theories of liability.1  
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INTRODUCTION 
The centerpiece of the enforcement program of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is its “insider” trading prosecutions.2 
Those cases typically involve individuals who trade on material 
nonpublic information affecting the price of a publicly traded stock.3 SEC 
insider trading claims are based on that agency’s premise that market 
integrity and fairness require that all traders have equal access to 
information material to the valuation of a publicly traded security.4  
Despite the fervor that it has applied to its insider trading enforcement 
actions, the SEC has endorsed unequal access to extremely market-
sensitive nonpublic information in the form of stock-exchange-generated 
“market data.”5 High-frequency and other professional traders (HFTs) are 
given preferred access to that data in exchange for lucrative fees charged 
by the stock exchanges.6 Market data fees are a “primary” source of 
income for those exchanges, providing revenues that totaled $5.4 billion 
in 2016.7 “[T]here have been massive increases in fees for market data in 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Peter J. Henning, Insider Trading Remains a Fixture for Securities Enforcement, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/business/dealbook/insider-
trading-enforcement-prosecution.html [https://perma.cc/Q4K2-AZGT] (describing recent high 
profile insider trading prosecutions). See generally DAVID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE 
STREET (1991) (describing prosecutions for insider trading in the 1980s that became the SEC’s 
signature crime). 
 3. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (3d 
ed. 2010) (describing insider trading claims). 
 4. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4–5 
(Nov. 8, 1961) (creating this “equal access” doctrine); see also infra Section IV.A (describing the 
SEC’s equal access doctrine and its limitations). 
 5. As one source notes, “[m]arket data is information about current stock prices, recent 
trades, and supply-and-demand levels sold by national securities exchanges.” Market Data, 
SIFMA, https://www.sifma.org/explore-issues/market-data/ [https://perma.cc/C7A5-YVE4]. 
 6. Gretchen Morgenson, NYSE, Nasdaq Rival Aims to Shed Light on Fee Profits, WALL 
ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/nyse-nasdaq-rival-aims-to-shed-light-on-fee-profits-115487 
83330 [https://perma.cc/ZD6Q-EHXF] (last updated Jan. 29, 2019, 9:25 PM). 
 7. Letter from Melissa MacGregor, Managing Dir. & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to 
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recent years.”8 One survey found that exchange market-data fees 
“skyrocketed” between 2010 and 2017, increasing by 1,100% during that 
period.9  
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA)—the principal securities industry trade organization for 
investment banks, stock brokerage firms, and other financial 
institutions—has challenged the explosion in market-data-fee charges by 
the stock exchanges before the SEC and in the courts.10 Traders 
disadvantaged by the unequal access to market data provided by the stock 
exchanges to HFTs have also challenged that disparity in the courts on a 
number of grounds.11  
As SIFMA has asserted, ready access to stock-exchange-generated 
market data “is essential to America’s world-leading capital markets 
because all participants need timely and complete data to make informed 
trading decisions.”12 Market data is an especially critical factor in the 
trading strategies of HFTs who are now dominating market volumes.13 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Market Data, supra note 5.  
 9. Market Data, PROJECT: INVESTED, http://www.projectinvested.com/market-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/M6QA-ELJ5]. 
 10. See id.; infra notes 183–86, and accompanying text (describing those challenges).  
 11. See In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 
342, 347, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 12. Market Data, supra note 9; Market Data, supra note 5. Another source also notes that 
“[m]arket data is a key part of successful markets, and as an industry we have consistently 
maintained that market data must be timely, comprehensive, nondiscriminatory, and accessible to 
all market participants at a reasonable cost.” Kenneth Bentsen, The Cost of Investing Is Going 
Down, So Why Are Market Data Fees Rising?, REALCLEAR MKTS. (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2019/01/31/the_cost_of_investing_is_going_down
_so_why_are_market_data_fees_rising_103602.html [https://perma.cc/BAX9-VWGL]. 
 13. City of Providence v. BATS Glob. Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“According to the plaintiffs, HFT firm transactions now account for nearly three-quarters of the 
exchanges’ equity trading volume.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 341 (2018); see also Hester Peirce, 
Meeting Market Structure Challenges Where They Are, 43 J. CORP. L. 335, 349 (2018) (describing 
the nature of HFT trading). As one court noted: 
Although there is no definitive definition of what constitutes HFT, the term 
generally refers to the practice of using computer-driven algorithms to rapidly 
move in and out of stock positions, making money by arbitraging small 
differences in stock prices—often across different exchanges—rather than by 
holding the stocks for an appreciable period of time.  
Barclays Liquidity Cross, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 349. The information driving these algorithms 
includes pending limit orders that show the depth of the market for a particular stock or 
commodity. See generally Jonathan Brogaard et al., Price Discovery Without Trading: Evidence 
from Limit Orders, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2019). That information is analyzed by the HFTs’ 
algorithms, which generate orders to respond to the expected market response to those pending 
orders, as where there is an order imbalance in long and short orders. See infra notes 108–09 and 
3
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HFTs are given privileged, advance access to critical market data by the 
exchanges in exchange for additional fees.14 This preferred access 
provides HFTs with a substantial edge in their trading,15 allowing HFTs 
to anticipate, game, and otherwise exploit the nonpublic orders of other 
traders.16 
The SEC has endorsed this disparity in access to exchange market data 
by HFTs,17 which conflicts with the SEC’s concerns in other contexts 
regarding the use of unequal access to material nonpublic information, 
i.e., “insider trading.”18 The SEC has broadly claimed elsewhere that 
                                                                                                                 
accompanying text (describing HFT trading). If the predicted change does not occur the HFT’s 
orders are cancelled. Petter Dahlström et al., The Determinants of Limit Order Cancellations, 
EUR. FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, June 2017, at 1–2. This whole process is often completed in the merest 
fractions of a second. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. The preferred access by HFTs 
also includes “co-located” servers that HFTs place near the exchanges’ servers to shave fractions 
of a second off order transmission times. See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text 
(describing the advantages of co-location). The exchanges rent space for this service. See infra 
note 113. 
 14. See infra Section I.C (describing that preferred access). 
 15. See infra Section I.C (describing how HFTs and other professional traders have 
supplanted traditional exchange-market makers). There has been much debate over whether the 
HFTs, on the one hand, are valuable to the market because they add liquidity and should be 
encouraged or whether, on the other hand, they are taking unfair advantage of slower, less 
sophisticated traders. See Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity 
Markets—From Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556–57 (2015).  
 16. As one court observed: 
The effects of HFT on the stock market are the subject of some controversy. 
Some commentators and, at points, the SEC, have stated that HFT firms have a 
positive effect on the market by creating significant amounts of liquidity, thereby 
permitting the national stock market to operate more efficiently and benefitting 
ordinary investors (including Plaintiffs). Others have sharply criticized the HFT 
firms' trading practices. Chief among their criticisms . . . is that the HFT firms 
use the speed at which they are capable of trading to identify the trading 
strategies being pursued by ordinary investors and react in a manner that forces 
ordinary investors to trade at a less advantageous price, with the HFT firm taking 
as profit a portion of the “delta”—that is, the difference between the price at 
which the ordinary investor would have traded and the price at which it actually 
traded as a result of the HFT firm's actions. For that reason, opponents of HFT, 
including Plaintiffs, often describe them as “predatory” or “toxic” trading 
strategies. More specifically . . . Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have provided 
the ingredients necessary for HFT firms to execute their predatory trading 
strategies and thereby enabled the HFT firms to exploit ordinary—that is, non-
HFT—investors.  
Barclays Liquidity Cross, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 350 (citations omitted). 
 17. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (describing the SEC’s public utility-like 
approach to the regulation of these fees). 
 18. See infra Section IV.A (describing the SEC’s insider trading theory). 
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insider trading occurs on stock exchanges whenever a trader trades on the 
basis of unequal access to material nonpublic information.19 Engaging in 
such activity can, and often does, result in a criminal conviction and jail 
time, as well as large civil fines.20 Yet, the privileged access to exchange 
market data available to HFTs is allowed and even encouraged by the 
SEC.21 It is more disconcerting that the SEC protects the unequal access 
of HFTs to this market data by limiting the fees that exchanges may 
charge to HFTs for that data, a process that is conducted through public-
utility-like rate-setting proceedings.22  
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with HFTs using their 
high-speed communication systems to trade ahead of slower traders.23 
That phenomenon has been present in the markets since the early days of 
stock trading. For example, traders with advance information have beaten 
other traders to the market using courier pigeons, smoke signals, 
telegraphs, telephones, fiber-optic cables, and, more recently, 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *3–5 
(Nov. 8, 1961) (creating this doctrine); see also infra Part V (discussing unequal access to 
information claims). 
 20. See 5 Surprising Facts About Insider Trading, FINRA (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.finra.org/investors/5-surprising-facts-about-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/L4T7-
PDUG]; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Introduction to RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER 
TRADING 1 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013) (describing insider trading as the most common 
violation of federal securities laws). 
 21. See infra Section II.A (discussing how the exchanges and the SEC have developed 
“maker-taker” arrangements to compensate HFTs for providing liquidity to the markets). As one 
author notes, HFT critics: 
[A]re concerned that HFT is harmful to retail investors, market quality and 
integrity, and market stability. They argue that HFT firms “front-run” the market. 
Critics also contend that even HFT’s contribution to the market—the liquidity 
HFT provides—is not as good as it seems at first glance; it is less deep, more 
transient, and more disruptive than the liquidity offered by more traditional 
market makers. Some market observers classify as unfair the methods HFT firms 
use—co-locating their computers next to the exchanges’ computers; paying for 
expensive private data feeds that are better and faster than the public ones; buying 
other potentially market-moving data; placing and cancelling many orders; and 
negotiating special order types that flash, hide, and slide. 
Peirce, supra note 13, at 348–49 (footnotes omitted); see also City of Providence v. BATS Glob. 
Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 41–43 (2d Cir. 2017) (describing claims of HFT abuses), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 341 (2018). 
 22. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n,  Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 
2018 WL 5023228, at *4–6 (Oct. 16, 2018); see also NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 527–28 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding the SEC failed to conduct a proper review of such fees), superseded by 
statute, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010), as recognized in NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 23. See Markham, supra note 15, at 557–59 (describing the high-speed communications 
HFTs use to trade and provide advantages over other slower traders). 
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microwaves.24 That being said, the privileged access to exchange market 
data given to HFTs appears to conflict with SEC insider trading doctrines 
that criminalize the activities of other traders having unequal access to 
material nonpublic information. This privileged access by HFTs also 
raises concerns over whether those traders are being allowed to engage in 
illegal “front running.” That practice is a subset of insider trading 
doctrines, i.e., front running involves accessing the confidential trading 
plans of other traders and then trading in front or ahead of those customer 
orders.25  
In 2014, a bestselling book exposed to the public the inequity in the 
access to exchange data by the HFTs.26 That revelation resulted in much 
litigation over the unfairness of giving HFTs this information 
advantage.27 Unfortunately, those cases have provided little guidance on 
the policy concerns raised by this disparate access to information or even 
its legality. The purpose of this Article is to address those issues. This 
Article will describe the nonpublic market data that the exchanges are 
selling to HFTs and other professional traders on a preferential basis. This 
Article will demonstrate that while this privileged access is inconsistent 
with the theoretical foundation for the SEC’s insider trading programs, 
market data has historically been treated as a proprietary product of the 
exchanges. That is, the government has allowed the exchanges to sell that 
information on a selective basis in the same manner as other 
commodities. 
Further, this Article contends that there is nothing inherently wrong 
with the sale of exchange data and that such data should not be treated as 
inside information. This Article supports this thesis through a 
comparative analysis of how insider trading is treated under the 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See id. (describing how those historical communications advances were used by traders 
to gain advantage).  
 25. “Front-running is the practice in which a ‘broker execut[es] orders on a security for its 
own account while taking advantage of advance knowledge of pending orders from its 
customers.’” Dichter-Mad Family Partners, LLP v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 n.5 
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Complaint at 22, Dichter-Mad Family Partners, 
LLP v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 2:09-cv-09061-SVW-FMO)), 
aff’d, 709 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). For example, the Justice Department brought 
criminal charges against individuals who disclosed the large orders of their brokerage firm 
customers to other traders who then traded in advance of those orders and profited from their 
market effect. See United States v. Mahaffy, 477 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563–64 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(describing the referenced scheme), aff’d in part and vacated in part, United States v. Mahaffy, 
285 F. App’x 797 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 26. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014) 
(explaining the unfairness of the practice of high-frequency trading). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 
3d 342, 347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA).28 That statute applies to 
commodity futures exchanges, where HFTs also dominate trading and 
have privileged access to exchange market data.29 The CEA rejects the 
SEC’s insider trading prohibitions when applied to commodity markets.30 
Instead, the CEA follows the common law doctrine that rejects the use of 
material nonpublic information in commodity transactions.31 That 
approach, which does not require disclosure before trading, has been in 
place for over two centuries and has worked well.32  
The adoption of this common law approach would relieve the SEC of 
its existing role of public-utility-like regulation of exchange market data 
fees. Instead, exchange charges for market data would be subjected to the 
antitrust laws. Those statutes are used to regulate monopolistic practices 
in other markets for fees charged for information or other commodity-
like services. This Article will also address other market integrity issues 
associated with the privileged access of HFTs to exchange market data. 
This includes claims that the privileged access by HFTs to exchange 
market data constitutes “front running” or “misappropriation” of the 
trading information of other traders. 
I.  EXCHANGE DATA AS A PROPRIETARY ASSET—SOME HISTORY 
A.  Stock Markets Become Data Centers 
The market data sold to the HFTs by the stock exchanges has 
historically been treated as a proprietary product that the exchanges own 
and may provide to select traders on a preferred basis.33 Indeed, the 
central thesis of exchange trading from its inception in the United States 
was limiting access to market data and trading executions to a select 
group of exchange members. For example, in the 1792 Buttonwood 
Agreement, which was the genesis of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the signers agreed that they would deal only in stocks among 
themselves and would “give a preference to each other in our 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2012)). 
The CEA prohibits restrictions on trading on nonpublic information that may affect commodity 
futures prices, even if that information may have a market effect. See id. §§ 6b(b), 9(1); see also 
infra Part III (describing the commodity future exchanges which are regulated under the CEA). 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Section IV.A (describing the common law approach); see also infra Section 
IV.C (describing the commodities markets’ rejection of insider trading prohibitions). 
 31. See infra Section IV.A (describing the common law approach); see also infra Section 
IV.C (describing the commodities markets’ rejection of insider trading prohibitions). 
 32. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (describing this common law approach). 
 33. See infra Section I.B. 
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Negotiations.”34 The NYSE limited the number of its members and 
denied or restricted access to its trading room, where information on stock 
values was shared with members only.35 For example, shortly after its 
formal creation in 1817, the NYSE prohibited its members from 
informing nonmembers of prices for stocks traded in the exchange’s 
trading room.36 That information was valuable for traders seeking to 
anticipate stock price movements, but its dissemination was limited to 
NYSE members. 
The NYSE’s secretive trading practices were not a sine qua non for 
the trading of stocks. In contrast to the NYSE’s exclusive access to 
members only, a freely accessible over-the-counter (OTC) market 
developed in speculative stocks not listed on the NYSE.37 That market 
was called the “curb” market, because it operated in the streets of New 
York.38 It had no official membership and was accessible to anyone who 
had the wherewithal to participate.39 It was an open market in which bid 
and ask quotations were shouted out in the street.40 Messengers 
transmitted those quotes through written messages or by hand signals to 
broker offices, where brokers could use that information to formulate 
trading decisions.41  
NYSE members were prohibited from trading NYSE-listed stocks in 
the curb market, but they could trade unlisted securities.42 Curb market 
traders that were not NYSE members were barred from access to NYSE 
trading data.43 The curb traders resorted to some desperate measures to 
gain access to that information. In 1837, the NYSE discovered that some 
nonmember traders had drilled a hole through a brick wall at the NYSE 
building that allowed them to overhear surreptitiously NYSE trading 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Olivia B. Waxman, How a Financial Panic Helped Launch the New York Stock 
Exchange, TIME (May 17, 2017), http://time.com/4777959/buttonwood-agreement-stock-
exchange/ [https://perma.cc/MV62-48HT] (describing the Buttonwood Agreement and its 
background). 
 35. See I JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900), at 159 (2002) (“The 
NYSE . . . barr[ed] public access to its trading sessions.”).  
 36. Id. at 124; see JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 70 (1999). 
 37. Ann Daly, “The New York Curb Market. . . Which Has No Organization Whatever”: 
The Enclosure of New York’s Last Outdoor Stock Market, 1900-1921, GOTHAM CTR. FOR N.Y.C. 
HIST. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/the-new-york-curb-market-which-has-
no-organization-whatever-the-enclosure-of-new-yorks-last-outdoor-stock-market-1900-1921 
[https://perma.cc/4MHM-297J]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 159. 
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activity.44 During the Civil War, NYSE did relent somewhat on 
nonmember access to its market data. Nonmembers were allowed to 
listen to trading on NYSE “through a keyhole for [a fee of] $100.”45 After 
the war, spectators were also allowed to watch trading from the gallery 
of the new NYSE floor located on Broad Street for a fee of only $50.46 
This set a precedent for selectively providing access to exchange market 
data for a fee. 
The stock market also early on witnessed the development of 
advanced communications systems that gave some traders an information 
edge in the acquisition of market data. For example, the creation of the 
telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century facilitated the reporting of stock 
market transactions throughout the country.47 The telegraph allowed 
traders to quickly transmit orders from remote locations, favoring traders 
with direct telegraph access to the exchanges.48 The telegraph also 
opened a lucrative market for exchanges to sell trading data to broker 
offices around the country.49  In 1890, the NYSE created the New York 
Quotation Company to handle the distribution of its trading data.50  
The stock “ticker,” another advanced communications device, further 
facilitated the development of the market for exchange data. The stock 
ticker allowed the exchange to transmit last sales reports off the exchange 
floor and displayed in brokers’ offices around the country.51 By the 
1930s, some 9,000 ticker tape machines were displaying NYSE trading 
data in brokerage firm offices.52 NYSE was also providing special access 
by members trading off the floor to market data through direct telephone 
lines53 and “through a bank of telephone operators.”54 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Bob Pisani, Plundered by Harpies, An Early History of High-Speed Trading, FIN. HIST., 
Fall 2014, at 2.  
 45. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 242. 
 46. Id. at 250. 
 47. See Pisani, supra note 44, at 22–23. 
 48. Id. The telegraph contributed to the consolidation of stock trading because most of the 
250 or so exchanges operating in the nineteenth century became redundant and were closed. I 
MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 334. 
 49. See Pisani, supra note 44, at 23. 
 50. See Kenneth Silber, The Ticker’s Rise and Fall, THINKADVISOR (Feb. 1, 2009, 2:00 
AM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2008/02/01/the-tickers-rise-and-fall/?slreturn=2018110411 
1948 [https://perma.cc/FWV9-PBRT].  
 51. See Pisani, supra note 44, at 23. 
 52. II JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. 
MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900–1970), at 226 (2002). 
 53. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 301.  
 54. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 149. 
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B.  Exchange Market Data Is Deemed Proprietary 
Like the stock exchanges, trading in commodities on the Board of 
Trade of the City of Chicago (CBOT) and other commodity exchanges 
generated valuable market data for traders. This data became a highly 
marketable commodity, and the CBOT contracted with the Western 
Union telegraph company to provide data from its trading floor to 
subscribers throughout the country.55 The CBOT used its control over this 
trading data to fend off competitive threats from “bucket shop” 
operators.56 Bucket shops were simply gambling operations that used 
CBOT market data being disseminated through Western Union to price 
their betting activities.57  Late in the nineteenth century, the CBOT sought 
to stop that practice by asking the courts to enjoin the bucket shop 
operators from accessing its Western Union market data through other 
subscribers.58 This touched off a fight in state and federal courts through 
litigation in which the Consolidated Stock Exchange, the Gold and Stock 
Telegraph Company, and the Commercial Telegram Company claimed 
that exchange market data was a matter of public interest and not 
exchange property.59  
After several setbacks in the lower courts,60 the Supreme Court in 
1905 upheld the right of an exchange to protect its proprietary market 
data from use by the bucket shops and other unauthorized persons.61 That 
ruling set a strong precedent for the proprietary treatment of such 
information as a commodity that could be selectively sold to preferred 
market participants. The Court stated that “the plaintiff's collection of 
quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade 
                                                                                                                 
 55. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 319.  
 56. Id. The NYSE was also the target of bucket shops. In 1905 there were some sixty bucket 
shop operators in Pittsburgh alone that were using NYSE trading information as the basis for 
betting schemes. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 6. 
 57. The Supreme Court defined a “bucket shop” as: “[A]n establishment, nominally for the 
transaction of a stock exchange business, or business of similar character, but really for the 
registration of bets, or wagers, usually for small accounts, on the rise or fall of the prices of stocks, 
grain, oil, etc. . . . .” Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 536 (1906) (quoting State v. 
McGinnis, 138 N.C. 724 (1905)). Unlike legitimate brokers, the bucket shops did not transmit 
customer orders for execution on the exchanges. Instead, they played a game of “Heads I win, 
Tails you lose.” See I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 318. That is, if the market turned against the 
customer, the bucket shop kept the customers’ monies and if adverse to the bucket shop, it would 
simply close and move its operations to a new location. Brendan Sapien, Note, Financial Weapons 
of Mass Destruction: From Bucket Shops to Credit Default Swaps, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 411, 
416 (2010). 
 58. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 319.  
 59. See J. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial 
Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON. 591, 606, 610–12 (1991). 
 60. See, e.g., id. at 621–23.  
 61. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250–51 (1905).  
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secret. The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or 
paid for doing, to itself.”62 
C.  Stock Exchange Floor Traders and “Specialists” 
Exchange trading data was also available on an even more privileged 
basis to traders operating on the floors of the stock exchanges.63 Those 
exchange members were given a time and place advantage over other 
traders.64 This is because stock quotations and last-sale reports were 
disclosed on the floor in advance of their transmission to other traders by 
telegraph or publication in newspapers.65 That time and place advantage 
meant that floor traders trading for their own accounts could respond to 
current, real-time market data before off-exchange traders received that 
information. This provided a tremendous trading advantage to the floor 
traders.66 The cost of that access was the requirement that the floor traders 
purchase an often very expensive membership on the exchange and pay 
membership fees.67 
The SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 193468 regulated the 
time and place advantage of stock exchange floor members.69 In the 
1960s, the SEC effectively eliminated the role of traders in trading 
opportunistically for their own accounts on exchange floors.70 
Nevertheless, “specialists” trading on their floors were allowed to retain 
their time and place advantage.71 These specialists were required to pay 
for that advantage by accepting an obligation to make a “continuous,” 
two-sided “fair and orderly” market.72 The SEC and the stock exchanges 
contended that those obligations justified the time and place advantage of 
the specialists, i.e., they provided a valuable service to off-exchange 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 250.  
 63. See Markham, supra note 15, at 578. 
 64. See id. (describing the time and place advantage and its importance to traders). 
 65. Id. at 578–79. 
 66. Id. at 578. 
 67. See id. at 577–78. 
 68. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq 
(2012)). 
 69. See id. § 78b(3) (recognizing necessary regulation because of the 
“markets . . . susceptibility to manipulation and control”). 
 70. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 333–34.  
 71. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining the 
advantages and powers of a specialist firm). 
 72. The requirement of a “continuous” market meant that the specialist had to stand ready 
to buy and sell the stocks in which it specialized throughout the trading day. See id. A “fair and 
orderly” market meant that the specialist was supposed to act as a stabilizing force in the market 
by buying stocks for its own account in a declining market and selling stock in a rising market. 
See id. at 92 n.2 (offering an example that demonstrates this).    
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traders and investors in the form of market liquidity.73 That liquidity 
allowed traders and investors to quickly and efficiently enter and exit the 
market.  
In addition to their time and place advantage, the exchanges gave 
specialists access to valuable nonpublic information by allowing them to 
maintain the “book” of pending customer “limit” orders.74 The order book 
provides information on the depth of the market: 
Depth-of-book data includes the best bids and offers 
available on an exchange, as well as limit order information 
in an exchange’s order book at inferior prices. Among other 
uses, this data provides pricing information that can inform 
traders how best to place trades that are larger than the 
quantities available at the best bid and offer.75  
This market data allowed the specialist to forecast market direction 
and depth and to respond to market events in advance of other traders.76 
Off-floor electronic traders, including HFTs, have now largely 
supplanted the specialist function; exchanges have given HFTs 
preferential access to the electronic depth-of-order book in return for 
large fees.77  
D.  Commodity Futures Exchange Floor Traders 
The CEA did not impose any restrictions on floor traders comparable 
to those adopted by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Floor traders on the commodity exchanges were not subject to any 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An 
Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970 DUKE L.J. 707, 741 (1970). 
 74. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 823–
24 (2001). A limit order is one “in which the customer specifies a minimum sale price or 
maximum purchase price, as contrasted with a market order, which implies that the order should 
be filled as soon as possible at the market price.” CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTC 
Glossary/index.htm#L [https://perma.cc/6VPT-TNGJ]. 
 75. Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 
WL 5023228, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2018).  
 76. See Borrelli, supra note 74, at 896. Before electronic trading, order books displays were 
not available because such information was maintained privately by specialists, floor traders, and 
floor brokers. See II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 125. The information then available was 
generally limited to current “bid” and “ask” quotes reported from the floor by voice 
communications. See id. 
 77. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of 
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866, 897–98 (2008); 
Markham, supra note 15, at 599–600. 
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market-making obligations.78 Rather, those floor traders were allowed to 
trade opportunistically with the time and place advantage that their 
location on exchange floors provided them.79 There was also no official 
specialist function on the commodity futures exchanges.80 Instead, floor 
traders competed with each other on what were perceived as equal terms. 
Nevertheless, their time and place advantage allowed floor traders to act 
on market information before off-floor traders could respond.81 Floor 
traders also had advance access to quotes by other floor traders and could 
react more quickly to that information than off-floor traders.82 Like the 
stock exchange specialists, floor traders have been largely replaced by 
HFTs and other electronic, off-exchange traders.83 
II.  THE SEC’S NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM 
A.  The SEC Creates a Centralized Market System for Stocks 
The computer age for data creation and management slowly trickled 
into the securities markets in the 1960s. “The NYSE [instituted] an 
automated quotation system in 1965 [for its stocks] that allowed brokers 
to obtain quotes from ‘talking’ computers.”84 This was an improvement 
from manual transmission of such information, but it was still a delayed 
process that favored the specialists and members accessing the data. 
The OTC market was also ripe for computerization. Quotes for OTC 
stocks were historically published manually through a news service 
provided by the National Quotation Bureau.85 Those publications were 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 223. 
 79. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The 
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 363, 367 (l99l) (advocating SEC-style fair and 
orderly floor trading requirements to prevent abuses on the floors of the commodity futures 
exchanges). 
 80. See Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly—Reform is Needed, 48 
WASH. & LEE  L. REV. 977, 1017 n.160 (1991). 
 81. See id. at 978. 
 82. See Jerry W. Markham, Prohibited Floor Trading Activities Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 36 (1989); Markham, supra note 80, at 978, 1022 
(describing the time and place advantage of commodity exchange floor traders). The commodity 
exchange floor traders were required to register with the CFTC and were subject to CFTC 
regulation. 7 U.S.C. § 6(e) (2012). That regulation was loose and ineffective. See Markham, 
supra, at 4–5 (describing abuses of the time and place advantage by commodity exchange floor 
traders). 
 83. See Markham, supra note 15, at 599. 
 84. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 345.  
 85. See Nick K. Liqudis, What Does It Mean When a Stock Trades on the Pink Sheets or 
the OTCBB?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-does-it-mean-
when-stock-trades-pink-sheets-or-otcbb/ [https://perma.cc/8PUW-ARZ7]; see also II MARKHAM, 
supra note 52, at 347 ("The wholesale or ‘inside’ quotations for over-the-counter securities were 
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popularly referred to as the “Pink Sheets” because of the color of their 
newsprint.86 The dissemination of this publication was delayed by the 
printing and manual distribution requirements. The SEC suggested in its 
1963 “Special Study of the Securities Markets” that computers, albeit still 
in their infancy, could be used to more efficiently and quickly report price 
quotes in OTC stocks.87 That observation was followed by the creation 
of Nasdaq in 1968.88 Nasdaq introduced an innovative electronic trading 
system that displayed quotations of OTC stocks through computer 
terminals made available to brokers and professional traders.89 Quote 
vendors began appearing and introducing desktop monitors into brokers’ 
offices, which supplied continuously updated price data on actively 
traded stocks.90 
The early appearance of computers on Wall Street did not prevent a 
near collapse of NYSE at the end of the 1960s. That event was the result 
of the inability of brokerage firms to handle the paperwork generated by 
an unexpected increase in trading volumes.91 Several NYSE firms failed 
during that crisis.92 This led the SEC to consider a complete revamping 
of the nation’s stock markets. The result was that, in 1973, the SEC 
announced its intent to create a “Central Market System,”93 “la[ying] the 
groundwork” for the creation of the “National Market System” (NMS) 
for the trading of public stocks.94  
The SEC’s plan for the NMS was to create a market involving “a 
system of communications by which the various elements of the 
marketplace, be the exchanges or OTC markets, are tied together.”95 The 
                                                                                                                 
published by the National Quotation Bureau, which was controlled by Commerce Clearinghouse. 
The daily, hard-print quotations of dealers were printed in the ‘pink sheets.’”). 
 86. Liqudis, supra note 85. 
 87. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 2, at 12 (1963) (“To mention only one more 
development, recent improvements in communications and data processing have had notable 
effects on the mechanics of doing business and the allocation of business, and there are strong 
indications that the full potential of these developments has not yet been realized.”). 
 88. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 347. 
 89. See id.; Our Heritage: The Evolution of Nasdaq, NASDAQ, https://business.nasdaq. 
com/discover/nasdaq-story/our-heritage/index.html [https://perma.cc/MW2R-SH4P]. 
 90. See II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 347.  
 91. SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 92-231, at 13 (1971) (describing the 1967 paperwork crisis). 
 92. Id. at 27.  
 93. SEC, SEC POLICY STATEMENT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL MARKET SYSTEM 11–12 
(1973). The SEC also evidenced this intent earlier in 1971. See Markham, supra note 15, at 601 
n.283.  
 94. See Markham, supra note 15, at 601 & n.283 
 95. SEC, STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE 
STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 8 (1972). 
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NMS envisioned by the SEC sought to create “offices and on exchange 
floors, linked together by an electronic communications network (ECN) 
and subject to a common regulatory framework.”96 The SEC sought a 
centralized market structure that would assure customers of the “best 
execution” price for a security wherever it was traded.97  
The SEC implemented the NMS in stages that took place over a period 
of several decades. The Securities Industry Automation Corporation 
(SIAC) was created in 1973 to promote automation and consolidation of 
trading in the stock exchanges.98 SIAC acted as the central trade price 
reporter for the Consolidated Tape Association (CTA).99 The CTA was 
created to consolidate the reporting of last-price sale reports on all stock 
exchanges through a composite tape.100 The composite tape contained an 
“A” tape for NYSE stocks, a “B” tape for other exchange-listed stocks, 
and a “C” tape for NASDAQ-listed securities.101  
Congress enacted legislation in 1975 that endorsed the SEC’s NMS 
plan.102 However, it took several decades for the SEC to adopt its present 
Regulation NMS, which comprehensively dictates the elements of the 
national market.103 In the meantime, the doctrine of unexpected 
consequences intervened. Electronic trading platforms were transforming 
equity and commodity futures markets from floor-driven, open-outcry 
operations into computerized trading conducted by traders operating off 
                                                                                                                 
 96. SEC, supra note 93, at 12. 
 97. See Best Execution, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answersbestexhtm.html [https://perma.cc/AWR9-WXH4] (last modified May 9, 2011). 
 98. See Securities Industry Automation Corporation, N.Y. INST. FIN., https://www.nyif. 
com/dictionary/s/term/securitiesindustryautomationcorporation [https://perma.cc/T62X-PMXE]. 
 99. See Joel Hasbrouck et al., New York Stock Exchange Systems and Trading Procedures 
7 (N.Y. Stock Exch., Working Paper No. 93-01, 1993); Securities Industry Automation 
Corporation, supra note 98. 
 100. See Hasbrouck et al., supra note 99, at 7; Overview, CONSOLIDATED TAPE ASS’N, 
https://www.ctaplan.com/index [https://perma.cc/A3K5-D2EB]. 
 101. U.S. Consolidated Tape Data, UTP PLAN, http://www.utpplan.com/DOC/Q11-
0037%20Sip%20Stats%20Sheet_0114c.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW8X-SLAG]. The Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced exchange-traded stock options in 1973 and other 
exchanges soon followed suit. Morris Mendelson, Exchange Traded Options and the Supply of 
Capital, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 65, 65 (1979). The SEC conditioned the expansion of 
options trading on a requirement for centralized trade clearing, which was carried out by the 
Options Clearing Corporation (OCC). Options Clearing Corporation (OCC), INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/occ.asp [https://perma.cc/854S-R8DU] (last updated May 
31, 2018). The exchanges also agreed to the creation of the Options Price Reporting Authority 
(OPRA) that publicly reported last sale option transactions on all options exchanges. See Notice 
of Receipt of Plan Filed Pursuant to Section 11A(a)(3)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Exchange Act Release No. 16,519, 1980 WL 29398 (Jan. 22, 1980).  
 102. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.  
 103. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600–.613 (2018). 
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the floor.104 Those electronic platforms removed the time and place 
advantage of the specialists and other classical market makers, including 
floor traders on the commodity futures exchanges.105  
The HFTs trading on electronic platforms supplanted the specialists 
and floor traders as market makers. As a result of these and other 
pressures, the stock and commodity exchanges transformed themselves 
from organizations mutually owned by their members into public 
companies owned by shareholders, which needed new revenue sources to 
replace membership and other fees generated by the now-obsolete floor 
trading operations.106 Market data fees charged to HFTs helped fill that 
void.107   
The HFTs accomplished this coup partly through the use of 
immediate, real-time access to sensitive market information that was once 
available only to specialists and floor traders.108 That information was 
then exploited by the HFTs’ proprietary algorithmic trading programs, 
which generate and execute orders within fractions of a second.109 HFTs 
determined their algorithms on the basis of a number of factors, including 
probability analysis of the trading and pending or anticipated orders of 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See generally Markham & Harty, supra note 77 (describing the implementation of new 
technology and its effects on the securities markets). The non-exchange electronic trading 
platforms were regulated by the SEC separately from the exchanges under Regulation ATS. See 
17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300–.304. 
 105. See generally Markham & Harty, supra note 77 (explaining the effects of 
computerization on the futures industry).  
 106. Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15 
J. APP. CORP. FIN. 105, 106–07 (2002) (citing increased competition from ECNs as one major 
factor driving exchanges to demutualize). 
 107. See id. at 105. 
 108. See Richard Finger, High Frequency Trading: Is it a Dark Force Against Ordinary 
Human Traders and Investors?, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2018, 8:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/richardfinger/2013/09/30/high-frequency-trading-is-it-a-dark-force-against-ordinary-
human-traders-and-investors/#6d7870676352 [https://perma.cc/SP72-GW77]. As the SEC 
observed, “[u]nlike years ago, trades today are transacted in milliseconds or faster and dispersed 
among many trading centers. These changes have allowed large market participants to employ 
sophisticated trading methods to trade electronically on multiple venues in huge volumes at very 
fast speeds.” SEC Adopts Large Trader Reporting Regime, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
(July 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-154.htm [http://perma.cc/Y2N6-
DPEY].  
 109. See Karl Flinders, The Evolution of Stock Market Technology, COMPUTER WKLY. (Nov. 
2, 2007, 2:59 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2007/11/02/227883/the-evolution-
of-stock-market-technology.htm [https://perma.cc/K4T6-PAHJ]. “[A] single algorithm can 
submit hundreds of orders per second . . . .” Concept Release on Risk Controls and System 
Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,546 (proposed Sept. 
12, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1). Computerized artificial intelligence is taking high-
frequency trading to new levels. See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the 
Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 909 (2018). 
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other traders.110 That information was in the exchanges’ depth-of-orders 
books, which the exchanges provided to HFTs in return for lucrative 
fees.111 This access undercut the role of the specialists who once 
controlled access to that data.112 HFTs obtained another time and place 
advantage through the “co-location” of their computer servers they 
placed at specially built exchange facilities, for which the exchanges 
charged more fees.113   
In this new trading environment, computerized trading platforms 
provided electronic order-matching services that proved an efficient 
alternative to floor trading by open outcry. Among other things, 
electronic trading helped reduce the effects of “slippage” and 
“latency.”114 “Slippage” is a reference to “the potential change in the 
price of an investment between the time an order is contemplated, 
entered, and executed.”115 “Latency” is a reference to the delays in order 
entry and execution that increase the risk of slippage, i.e., the longer the 
execution time, the greater the likelihood of an adverse price movement 
or loss of a trading opportunity.116  
In the days of exchange floor trading, latency and slippage placed off-
floor traders at a severe disadvantage, while providing specialists and 
floor traders with a decided edge over those traders. Electronic trading 
removed the time and place advantages of specialists and floor traders. 
Their low latency access also “enables HFT firms to access stock prices 
a split second before the rest of the investing public.”117   
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Finger, supra note 108 (describing how these algorithms work and their strategic 
advantages over traditional traders). 
 111. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: BACKGROUND, CONCERNS, 
AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 35 (2014). 
 112. See Markham, supra note 15, at 559–60. 
 113. As was observed in Congress: “Another key tactic used by high-frequency trading firms 
is co-location. This practice involves trading firms literally renting space for their computers in 
the same room as the computers that run the stock exchanges so that they can receive market 
information directly from the exchanges’ computers as fast as possible.” Conflicts of Interest, 
Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th 
Cong. 5 (2014) (statement of Sen. McCain, Member, Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs). 
 114. See Markham, supra note 15, at 560–61.  
 115. Id.; see also Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (“The 
time expended in placing phone calls allowed market positions . . . to change, often resulting in 
serious losses . . . . The negative effect resulting from such a delay is known in the industry as 
‘slippage.’”). 
 116. See Markham, supra note 15, at 560–61. 
 117. Elvis Picardo, You’d Better Know Your High-Frequency Trading Terminology, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/042414/youd-better-know-
your-highfrequency-trading-terminology.asp [https://perma.cc/E5ZJ-8AT2] (last updated Feb. 
13, 2018). The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has noted that: 
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The HFTs’ efforts to reduce latency had remarkable success. “Public 
data from one exchange group, for example, indicates that roundtrip trade 
times on its trading platform fell from 127 milliseconds in 2004 to 4.2 
milliseconds in 2011.”118 A millisecond is one thousandth of a second. 
“Another exchange group reported in 2010 that its average blended 
transaction time in futures and OTC markets was 1.25 milliseconds.”119 
Electronic trading has advantages beyond the reduction of risk from 
latency and slippage. Among other things, customer orders can be 
matched against each other without a specialist or floor trader taking the 
“spread.”120 However, the loss of the specialists and floor traders poses a 
                                                                                                                 
In response to the emphasis on speed by trading firms, [exchanges] have adopted 
highly automated trading systems that can offer extremely high-speed order entry 
and execution. In addition, to further reduce latency in transmitting market data 
and order messages, many trading markets offer co-location and/or proximity 
hosting services that enable market participants to place their servers in close 
proximity to the trading market’s matching engine. Accordingly, the growth of 
co-location and/or proximity hosting services is largely related to the 
development of high frequency trading in the futures and option markets. 
Co-Location/Proximity Hosting Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,198, 33,199 (proposed June 11, 2010) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 36–38). As was observed in a Congressional hearing: “Another 
key tactic used by high-frequency trading firms is co-location. This practice involves trading firms 
literally renting space for their computers in the same room as the computers that run the stock 
exchanges so that they can receive market information directly from the exchanges’ computers as 
fast as possible.” Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in 
U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, supra note 113; see also Definition of Co-location, FIN. TIMES, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/TERM?TERM=CO_LOCATION [https://perma.cc/RA8G-6N2W] (“‘[C]o-
location’ shaves crucial milliseconds from the time it takes to complete a trade.”). 
 118. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,546 (proposed Sept. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
ch. 1). 
 119. Id. In 2014, one exchange determined that “11% of all 2014 observable orders lasted 
less than one millisecond.” How Fast is High-Frequency Trading? Faster Than You Think, 
EQUEDIA (May 3, 2015), http://www.equedia.com/how-fast-is-high-frequency-trading/ 
[https://perma.cc/3XEL-USP6]. “In today’s electronic financial markets, a single investor can 
execute more than 10,000 trades a second, meaning more than 1,000 trades can happen in the 
blink of an eye.” High-Frequency Traders Need a Speed Limit, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan. 25, 
2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-01-25/high-frequency-
traders-need-a-speed-limit [https://perma.cc/AQ5U-SZBS]. 
 120. Specialists and floor traders quoted a two-sided market at a “spread.” See JERRY W. 
MARKHAM ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE: DEBT, EQUITY AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND THEIR 
INTERMEDIARIES 546–47 (3d ed. 2011) (describing profiting from the spread). That is, the 
specialist or floor trader would quote both a “bid” (buy) and “ask” (sell or offer). See id. The bid 
in this spread would be less than the ask price. See id. This meant that all things being equal the 
specialists or floor traders would profit by the difference in the spread as other traders bought and 
sold from those market makers. See id. Market makers never take “long-term views on where 
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concern that, in the absence of such market makers, liquidity gaps might 
occur. This is because the specialists and floor traders would no longer 
be willing to risk their capital to provide liquidity in the absence of their 
former time and place advantage and ability to profit on the spread.  
To address this liquidity concern, the exchanges adopted various fee 
arrangements that compensated traders, such as HFTs, to provide 
liquidity to their markets and to charge traders benefiting from that 
liquidity—the so-called “maker-taker” exchange liquidity model. As the 
SEC described these arrangements: 
[T]he predominant transaction pricing structure that 
developed among equities exchanges to attract order flow is 
the “maker-taker” fee model. Specifically, out of thirteen 
equities exchanges, seven utilize the “maker-taker” fee 
model, in which they pay a rebate to a provider of liquidity 
and charge a fee to a taker of liquidity. Among the remaining 
exchanges, four utilize a “taker-maker” pricing model (also 
called an inverted model) where they charge a fee to a 
provider of liquidity and pay a rebate to a taker of liquidity, 
and two have a “flat fee” model. In recent years this area has 
attracted considerable attention and generated significant 
debate, focusing on the effects, both positive and negative, 
that exchange transaction-based pricing models may have on 
market quality and execution quality . . . .121 
Informational and transmission advantages allow HFTs to receive 
order-book information on pending and executed orders before other 
traders. The HFTs now have the equivalent of the time and place 
advantage once enjoyed by the stock exchange specialists and floor 
traders in the open outcry pits. Moreover, the HFTs are specially 
compensated through rebates for their liquidity-providing orders. The 
HFTs’ ability to execute orders at speeds faster than other traders has 
allowed them to dominate volume on the futures and securities markets. 
By 2009, some two-thirds of stock-market volume were attributable to 
                                                                                                                 
stock prices [are] heading. Instead, [they] aim[] to profit off tiny differences between what 
investors [are] willing to pay for heavily traded stocks and what others [are] willing to sell them 
for.” Aaron Lucchetti, Firms Seek Edge Through Speed As Computer Trading Expands, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2006, 12:01 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116615315551251136 
[https://perma.cc/JT5Y-PU8D].  
 121. Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks, 84 Fed. Reg. 5202, 5202–03 (proposed Feb. 20, 
2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 242) (footnotes omitted).  
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HFTs.122 One study found that between 2012 and 2014, automated 
trading systems accounted for over sixty percent of equity futures.123 By 
2010, HFTs had “largely . . . replaced more traditional types of liquidity 
providers in the equity markets.”124 
Regulation NMS laid the groundwork for this market transformation 
without much consideration of the consequences of its effects:  
The SEC adopted a system [in Regulation NMS] that put 
the premium on speed in execution at a specific price, 
without considering the effect it would have upon the 
balance between market professionals’ duties and 
responsibilities to customers and the effects on the market in 
general.  Regulation NMS essentially shifted the duties from 
the specialists and market makers to the traders themselves 
by imposing rules that required brokers to execute orders in 
the fastest manner possible, prompting brokerage firms and 
exchanges to interconnect and develop sophisticated 
computer systems to route trades in a maze-like fashion.125 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Jason Zweig, Staying Calm in a World of Dark Pools, Dark Doings, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
24, 2009, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125633417039504555?ns=prod/accounts-
wsj [https://perma.cc/Q4WX-98CN]. 
 123. RICHARD HAYNES & JOHN S. ROBERTS, AUTOMATED TRADING IN FUTURES MARKETS 4, 
5 tbl.3 (2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_ 
automatedtrading.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8RL-RUZR].  
 124. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607 (proposed Jan. 
21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 242). The SEC noted in that regard: 
Highly automated exchange systems and liquidity rebates have helped 
establish a business model for a new type of professional liquidity provider that 
is distinct from the more traditional exchange specialist and over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) market maker. In particular, proprietary trading firms and the 
proprietary trading desks of multi-service broker-dealers now take advantage of 
low-latency systems and liquidity rebates by submitting large numbers of non-
marketable orders (often cancelling a very high percentage of them), which 
provide liquidity to the market electronically. 
Id. at 3599. The dark side of these rebates has been the entry of large numbers of fictitious trades 
that give the false appearance of liquidity. See, e.g., In re Gelber Group, LLC, CFTC No. 13-15, 
2013 WL 525839 (Feb. 8, 2013); Rosenthal Collins Capital Markets, LLC, CFTC No. 17-17, 2017 
WL 2839495 (June 29, 2017). 
 125. Bradley J. Bondi, Memo To Michael Lewis: The Excesses of High-Speed Trading Are a 
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B.  NMS Data Sharing Requirements 
The SEC’s conceptual NMS sought “to link securities markets nation-
wide in order to distribute market data economically and equally and to 
promote fair competition among all market participants.”126 Key to this 
goal was uniform market availability of market data.127 This included a 
centralized display of price quotations for stocks traded in multiple 
markets.128 As implemented, Regulation NMS requires exchanges and 
other market centers to make information on prices and volumes available 
automatically for all securities in all markets and to allow all qualified 
broker–dealers access to the markets.129 
                                                                                                                 
 126. NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2010), superseded by statute, Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010), as recognized in NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also 
NetCoalition, 715 F.3d at 345 (quoting the language used in NetCoalition I).  
 127. As was noted in one report on this issue: 
Information is the lifeblood of a financial market and the procedures for 
collecting and disseminating information have a direct impact on the public’s 
trust and confidence in the financial system. The importance of market 
information was stated elegantly by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission . . . when it noted that a “consolidated, real-time stream of market 
information has been an essential element in the success of the U.S. securities 
markets. It is the principal tool for enhancing the transparency of the buying and 
selling interest in a security, for addressing the fragmentation of the buying and 
selling interest among different market centers, and for facilitating the best 
execution of customers’ orders by their broker-dealers.”  
MICHAEL J. BARCLAY, REPORT TO THE SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MARKET INFORMATION RE: 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-42208, at 1 (2001), https://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/appendixk.pdf [https://perma.cc/423M-LGZV] (quoting SEC 
Concept Release: Regulation of Market Information and Revenues, Release No. 34-4228, at 4). 
 128. SEC, supra note 93, at 11. 
 129. In adopting Regulation NMS, the SEC stated that: 
Regulation NMS includes new substantive rules that are designed to modernize 
and strengthen the regulatory structure of the U.S. equity markets. First, the 
“Order Protection Rule” requires trading centers to establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the 
execution of trades at prices inferior to protected quotations displayed by other 
trading centers, subject to an applicable exception. To be protected, a quotation 
must be immediately and automatically accessible. Second, the “Access Rule” 
requires fair and non-discriminatory access to quotations, establishes a limit on 
access fees to harmonize the pricing of quotations across different trading 
centers . . . . 
Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified in scattered sections 
of 17 C.F.R.). 
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The NMS resulted in the creation of market data that was, in some 
instances, necessary for market participants to meet their NMS 
obligations and, in other instances useful, though not necessary. Market 
data is “distributed exclusively by exchanges in a two-tier system 
comprised of (1) a stream that distributes [to the public] ‘best-priced’ 
quotations and ‘last-sale’ [prices] for securities, and [(2)] faster 
proprietary data products that include ‘depth-of-book’ information that 
shows all other bid offers.”130 The SEC classified these two tiers as “core 
data” and “non-core data,” and further authorized the exchanges to sell 
this data to market participants.131 Core data is used by industry 
participants to meet their “best execution”132 and “trade-through”133 
obligations under Regulation NMS.134 Core data is consolidated from 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Market Data, supra note 5. 
 131. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,569. “Because exchanges control both tiers of 
information, they have enormous pricing power over the cost to access the data.” Market Data, 
supra note 5. As the SEC noted: 
When a market participant submits an order to an exchange (or cancels or 
modifies one), or when an exchange executes an order, that action creates data 
that is valuable to other market participants because of the information it 
provides about the price and quantity of executed transactions and the investor 
trading interest in particular securities. Because that data is valuable 
(individually and in combination with other order and execution data), the 
exchanges sell that data to market participants. Exchanges have packaged and 
monetized the provision of market data in several ways, including monetizing 
within the following two categories of data: core and non-core data. 
Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 WL 
5023228, at *4 (Oct. 16, 2018) (footnote omitted).  
 132. The best execution requirement requires broker–dealers to execute customer orders at 
the national best bid or offer (NBBO) available on any exchange where the security is traded. See 
FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-46, at 2 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/ 
notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_15-46.pdf [https://perma.cc/874J-36WT] (describing the 
best execution obligation). 
 133. The trade through or “order protection” rule prevents the execution of orders at prices 
less favorable than pending orders on any exchange. Memorandum from SEC Division of Trading 
& Markets to the SEC Market Structure Advisory Committee (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.sec. 
gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-rule-611-regulation-nms.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7BL-J5ME] (describing 
the “trade-through” rule). 
 134. The SEC has noted: 
Core data for each NMS security consists of three components: (1) last sale 
reports, which include the price at which the latest sale of the security occurred, 
the size of the sale, and the exchange where the execution took place; (2) the 
current highest bid and lowest offer for the security, along with the number of 
shares available at those prices, at each exchange; and (3) the “national best bid 
and offer,” or NBBO, which is the highest bid and lowest offer currently 
available on a U.S. exchange and the exchange(s) where those prices are 
22
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NMS market participants by central data processers called “securities 
information processors” (SIPs).135 These are “monopolistic” entities that 
operate under joint industry plans that are controlled by the exchanges 
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).136 The SEC’s 
“Access Rule” in Regulation NMS “requires fair and non-discriminatory 
access to quotations, [and] establishes a limit on access fees to harmonize 
the pricing of quotations across different trading centers. . . .”137  
The exchanges also generate, and charge fees for, additional market 
data that the SEC labels as “non-core data.”138 This information is not 
required to be reported to SIPs for central distribution.139 Instead, the 
exchanges may sell this information separately to HFTs or other market 
participants.140 Non-core data includes depth-of-order book information 
that plays a key role in the algorithmic trading of HFTs.141 Non-core data 
                                                                                                                 
available. 
Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 WL 
5023228, at *4 (Oct. 16, 2018) (footnote omitted).  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. The development of this process was described by one court as follows: 
Prior to 1975, the U.S. stock market was fragmented among several stock 
exchanges. In general, investors seeking to purchase a stock on a particular 
exchange interacted only with investors also trading on that exchange, and stocks 
were often traded at different prices on different exchanges. In 1975, Congress 
amended the Exchange Act to, among other things, give the SEC authority to 
issue rules that would stitch the disparate exchanges into a single national market. 
Since those amendments, the SEC has enacted a host of regulations to fulfill 
Congress's vision of a unified national stock market. In 2005, those measures 
were consolidated into a rule known as “Regulation NMS” (“NMS” being short 
for “national market system”), which, among other things, requires exchanges to 
produce national market system plans (“NMS Plans”) to facilitate the 
development and operation of a national market for securities. Pursuant to its 
NMS Plan, an exchange must transmit real-time information regarding 
transactions on that exchange to a centralized entity (the “Processor”) that then 
consolidates the information into a single, unified data feed (or “consolidated 
feed”).  
In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342, 348–49 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citations omitted), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 137. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). 
 138. Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 
WL 5023228, at *4 (Oct. 16, 2018). 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.   
 141. “Broadly speaking, this term [depth-of-order book] refers to the quantity of buying and 
selling interest and the potential activity on each side of the market.” SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL 
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may be supplied to HFTs in advance of the core data supplied to other 
market participants.142 “These time and information differences may 
offer valuable trading opportunities.”143   
The fees charged by the exchanges for non-core data are substantial. 
Professional traders (including HFTs) pay a monthly fee for direct access 
to this data, plus a monthly fee for each device using the data.144 Non-
professional traders pay a lower per-device fee to broker–dealers 
subscribing to this service.145 However, this information is not supplied 
directly to non-professional customers. Rather, they have to obtain it 
indirectly from their broker-dealers or other firms having data 
distribution licenses issued by the exchanges.146 This causes a substantial 
                                                                                                                 
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 
88-95, pt. 2, at 17 (1963). The SEC has further described this non-core data as follows: 
In addition to the best bids and offers available on an exchange, depth-of-book 
data includes the outstanding limit orders to buy stocks at prices lower, or to sell 
stocks at prices higher, than the best prices on each exchange. In other words, 
and using a potential purchase as an example, depth-of-book data provides a 
trader who may want to buy a number of shares that exceeds the number of shares 
available at the best price with the number of displayed shares available at prices 
that are higher than the best price. This information allows the trader to determine 
the degree to which the total purchase price for her larger purchase would be 
expected to differ from what the broker would pay if the trade were smaller in 
size and could be executed in full at the prevailing best price. If a larger purchase 
could be executed at or close to the prevailing best price, the market is said to 
have “depth”—specifically, depth on the ask side (e.g., willing sellers at or just 
above the prevailing best price).  
Depth-of-book data provides market participants with other valuable 
supplemental information. For example, depth-of-book-data can provide a trader 
with the ability to calculate market imbalance information at various price levels. 
This information allows the trader to gain a fuller picture of the balance of supply 
and demand within a market across multiple price levels, which could potentially 
provide a directional market signal. Turning back to the example of a broker 
seeking to execute a large purchase, if there is depth on the ask side of the market 
(those willing to sell) so that the larger purchase can be made at or slightly above 
the prevailing market price but there is little depth on the bid side of the market 
(those willing to buy), that imbalance may provide a bearish signal.  
Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 WL 
5023228, at *5 (Oct. 16, 2018) (footnotes omitted). 
 142. Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 
WL 5023228, at *5 (Oct. 16, 2018). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., id. at *6 (noting that there was a monthly fee for direct access to the data feed 
and for devices used). 
 145. See, e.g., id. (explaining that professional subscribers paid $30 in monthly device fees 
while nonprofessionals paid $10). 
 146. See id.  
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latency disadvantage, especially when the trader does not have the benefit 
of server co-location. The exchanges thus provide privileged access to 
this data to some 100 firms that have been responsible for up to ninety 
percent of trades.147 Ultimately, the exchanges provide unequal access to 
critical trading data, and this small universe of HFTs is uniquely qualified 
to exploit it through co-location and algorithmic trading.148  
HFTs are favored in other ways. As noted above, electronic exchanges 
provide monetary incentives to HFTs that supply liquidity to the market 
and thereby help fill gaps in order matching.149 Such incentives are 
necessary because the HFTs are not subject to any market-making 
obligations, such as those previously imposed on specialists.150 Instead, 
the exchanges pay for order flow originated by the HFTs, creating a self-
serving circle of revenue between the HFTs and the exchanges.151 This 
arrangement allows the HFTs to prey on other slower, less-informed 
traders. 
C.  SEC Market Data Rate Setting Efforts 
1.  Background 
The 1960s witnessed a sea change in the approach taken by the courts 
and the SEC in the control exercised by stock exchanges over their 
trading data. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,152 the United States 
Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws applied to the actions of NYSE 
in cutting off direct telephone connections that were transmitting market 
data from member firms to non-member firms.153 The Court recognized 
that the non-member subscribers should have been given notice and 
opportunity to be heard before those links were severed.154 That decision, 
however, provides little or no antitrust protection to persons seeking 
access to exchange market data. In other cases, the Supreme Court held 
that the antitrust laws preempted the federal securities laws where the 
challenged actions were subject to SEC oversight.155 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See id. at *18.  
 148. See id. 
 149. See Picardo, supra note 117.  
 150. See supra notes 72, 76–77 and accompanying text.  
 151. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (describing the fee arrangements used 
to manage market liquidity). 
 152. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
 153. Id. at 365. 
 154. Id. The connections that were severed included stock ticker service directly to the 
plaintiff from the NYSE floor. Id. at 344. 
 155. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283 (2007) (finding 
underwriting activities enjoyed antitrust immunity because of SEC oversight); Gordon v. N.Y. 
Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975); see also United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 
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The SEC conducts oversight of exchange market data fees, but that 
oversight may not completely shield the exchanges from private actions 
under the federal securities laws. In City of Providence v. BATS Global 
Markets, Inc.,156 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that stock exchanges were subject to liability under the anti-
manipulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act with respect to 
their two-tier system for fees charged to HFTs and the fees charged to 
other traders with more limited access to market data.157 The Second 
Circuit rejected a claim that the exchanges’ self-regulatory role and SEC 
oversight granted the exchanges absolute immunity from lawsuits 
challenging their fees.158 The Court held that this conduct, if proved, was 
actionable under the Securities Exchange Act.159  
                                                                                                                 
Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734–35 (1975) (implying repeal of antitrust laws for resale restrictions for 
mutual fund shares).  
 156. 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 341 (2018). 
 157. Id. at 51–52. As the Second Circuit described these claims: 
Here, plaintiffs allege that the defendant exchanges created products and 
services for HFT firms that illicitly “rigged the market” in the firms' favor in 
exchange for hundreds of millions of dollars in fees. According to plaintiffs, 
these products and services provided HFT firms with the ability to access market 
data at a faster rate, obtain non-public information, and take priority over 
ordinary investors' trades. Plaintiffs further allege that the exchanges failed to 
disclose the full impact that such products and services would have on market 
activity and knowingly created a false appearance of market liquidity that, 
unbeknownst to plaintiffs, resulted in their bids and orders not being filled at the 
best available prices.  
. . . Plaintiffs further allege that, unbeknownst to them, the proprietary data 
feeds and co-location services provided HFT firms with virtually exclusive 
access to detailed trading data in time to “front-run” other market participants by 
anticipating large pending transactions, buying and driving up the prices for the 
stocks before those orders were placed, and forcing investors to pay more for 
those stocks than they otherwise would have. 
Id. at 49.  
 158. Id. at 48. 
 159. Id. at 52. Earlier, in Lanier v. BATS Exchange, Inc., the Second Circuit upheld the 
dismissal of breach of contract claims charging that stock exchanges were allowing HFTs to 
access market data faster than other market participants receiving information from securities 
information processors. Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., 838 F.3d 139, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2016). The 
Court held that such claims were preempted by the Securities Exchange Act and that the SEC had 
authorized such disparate access. Id. at 143. In another case, Citadel Securities LLC v. Chicago 
Board Options Exchange, Inc., a district court held that the CBOE was immune from a suit 
challenging fees charged by that exchange to market makers as payments for order flow from 
customers. Citadel Sec. LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., No. 16 C 9747, 2018 WL 5264195, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2018). The suit claimed the exchange was not properly monitoring whether 
trades were subject to the fees. Id. at *1, *4. The court ruled that that such activity was within the 
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The SEC’s efforts to oversee the amounts of fees charged by the 
exchanges for non-core data have been challenged twice in the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals. In the first challenge, NetCoalition v. 
SEC,160 the court held that the SEC could properly allow market forces, 
i.e., competition among the exchanges in attracting order flow, to assure 
that fees were fair and reasonable.161 The court also held, however, that 
the record evidence considered by the SEC did not support its conclusion 
as to the effectiveness of that competition.162  
The same fees were challenged again after remand, but the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that it did not have the power to review the exchange 
rule in the absence of an order of the SEC resolving a challenge to the 
fees.163 The SEC issued such an order on October 16, 2018.164 There, the 
SEC reversed itself, finding that market forces were not shown to be 
adequate to assure that exchange fees are reasonable and fair.165 The 
exchanges must now seek to justify their claim that market discipline 
makes a public utility-like rate setting decision by the SEC unnecessary. 
Following that decision, a number of large institutional traders and HFTs 
announced plans to create a low-cost electronic that would provide 
reduced fees for members and compete with NYSE and Nasdaq.166 If 
successful, this venture would be a return to the exchanges of yesteryear 
that provided privileged time and place access to members at reduced 
fees.167 
                                                                                                                 
regulatory role of the exchange and, therefore, immune from suit. Id. at *4; see also In re Barclays 
Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342, 359–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(dismissing similar claims on grounds of exchange immunity and failure to properly plead other 
allegations), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017); cf. Zola v. TD Ameritrade, Inc. 889 F.3d 920 
(8th Cir. 2019) (preempting a state class action with respect to claim that defendant routed orders 
to venues where HFTs could take advantage of the orders in exchange for rebates). 
 160. 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010), superseded by statute, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), as recognized 
in NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 161. Id. at 535. 
 162. Id. at 537–44. 
 163. NetCoalition, 715 F.3d at 354. 
 164. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 
2018 WL 5023228 (Oct. 16, 2018). 
 165. Id. at *2–3. 
 166. See Diptendu Lahiri, Wall Street Financial Firms Plan New Exchange to Challenge 
NYSE, Nasdaq, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2019, 8:56 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/wallstreet-
exchange/wall-street-financial-firms-plan-new-exchange-to-challenge-nyse-nasdaq-idUSL3N1 
Z73S9 [https://perma.cc/J4JP-AY5J].  
 167. Other new exchanges are also forming to compete with existing exchanges for market 
data fees. See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich & Gunjan Banerji, As Stock Exchanges Multiply, Miami 
Wants In on the Game, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2019, 8:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-
exchange-competition-heats-up-as-miax-eyes-launch-11551704521 [https://perma.cc/7FRD-YCZF]. 
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2.  Transaction Fees 
Coupled with the uncertainty over the fairness of market data fees is 
the related concern over fees for completed transactions through 
exchange facilities, so-called core data. The SEC established a uniform 
limitation on data fees for this market data as a part of Regulation 
NMS.168 That appropriation of exchange proprietary information is 
inconsistent with the view that information is a commodity that should 
trade freely at prices set by the market, not the government. It is, however, 
necessary for the operation of the NMS’s mandate of best execution169 
and for the enforcement of the trade through the rule because such 
information is needed to meet those obligations.170 The SEC, therefore, 
mandated the disclosure of the exchange market data needed to carry out 
that and other NMS obligations for linked stock markets. “The 
implementation of this mandate by the SEC did improve linkages 
between exchanges, but it also weakened the property rights of 
information producers.”171    
In 2018, the SEC went further in its determination to regulate market 
data by mandating a pilot program that it will use to analyze the effects 
of execution fees and related rebate pricing that encourage traders to 
conduct a large volume of transactions on particular exchanges.172 That 
pilot program will seek to determine the effects of execution fees and 
rebates, including maker-taker payments, “on order routing behavior, 
execution quality, and market quality.”173 The SEC’s pilot fee program 
separates listed stocks into groups with different fee price controls for 
each of those categories.174 NYSE challenged this pilot fee program in 
court, charging that the plan was an “unnecessary exercise in government 
price-setting that will add a new layer of complexity to equity 
markets.”175 NYSE further asserted that “the SEC’s pilot cuts at the heart 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,503 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) (setting the uniform fee limitation at $0.003 per share). 
 169. See id. at 37,505. 
 170. See id. at 37,496, 37,503. 
 171. Corinne Bronfman & James A. Overdahl, Would the Invisible Hand Produce 
Transparent Markets 7 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Working Paper No. 92-10, 1993). 
 172. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.610T (2019); Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks, 84 Fed. Reg. 
5202, 5203 (Feb. 20, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 242). 
 173. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks (Dec. 19, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-298 [https://perma.cc/JH7N-V4NE].  
 174. Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks, 84 Fed. Reg. at 5203.  
 175. Stacy Cunningham, We’re Suing the SEC to Protect the Stock Market, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
14, 2019, 6:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/were-suing-the-sec-to-protect-the-stock-
market-11550188636 [https://perma.cc/NS95-6WKW]. The SEC stayed its pilot program 
pending the outcome of this litigation. Alexander Osipovich, SEC Delays Program to Rein in 
Rebates in Win for Stock Exchanges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
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of NYSE’s core mission of providing an orderly, transparent and efficient 
marketplace.”176 
3.  Clearing Fees 
The SEC also has inconsistently regulated clearing fees charged by 
the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC). The OCC was designated 
under the Dodd–Frank Act177 as a systemically important financial utility, 
which subjected it to increased regulatory scrutiny.178 The OCC then 
developed a capital enhancement plan that included an increase in the 
amount of the capital contributions of its shareholder exchange 
members.179 Those shareholders were to be compensated for their 
contributions from fees charged to clearing members that use the OCC to 
clear and settle trades.180 The action was approved by the SEC in 
deference to the OCC’s determination of its necessity, but was later 
challenged in the D.C. Circuit.181 That court held that the SEC had failed 
to consider properly whether this plan was consistent with requirements 
in the Securities Exchange Act governing the OCC.182  
The circuit court remanded the issue to the SEC for its further 
consideration.183 The plan was then again challenged by SIFMA.184 The 
SEC thereafter reversed its earlier position and rejected the OCC fees for 
its capital plan.185 The SEC took this action on the grounds that the OCC 
did not comply with its bylaws in adopting the new fee structure and that 
there was a lack of information from the OCC to justify the fee charges 
as not being a burden on competition.186 
                                                                                                                 
sec-delays-program-to-rein-in-rebates-in-win-for-stock-exchanges-11553827006 [https://perma. 
cc/8MJY-SDMZ]. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–
5641 (2012)). 
 178. See Susquehanna Int’l Grp., LLP v. SEC, 866 F.3d 442, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 179. See id. at 444. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 444–46. 
 182. See id. at 446. For example, the Securities Exchange Act requires that a clearing agency 
“not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the 
purposes of” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)(3)(I) (2012).  
 183. Susquehanna Int’l Grp., 866 F.3d at 451. 
 184. Letter from Ellen Greene, Managing Dir., SIFMA, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC 2 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Response-to-OCC-Capital-
Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EWJ-WS4U].  
 185. See Order Disapproving Proposed Rule Change Concerning the Options Clearing 
Corporation’s Capital Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 5157 (Feb. 13, 2019).  
186. See id.  
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III.  COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS  
The CFTC regulates commodity futures exchanges under the CEA.187 
Commodity futures exchanges deal in derivative instruments, i.e., 
futures, options, and swaps.188 Historically, the commodities underlying 
those contracts were agricultural products.189 Today, most of those 
underlying commodities are financial instruments that are subject to SEC 
regulation.190 Nevertheless, futures and options on such instruments are 
regulated by the CFTC when their derivatives are traded on a futures 
exchange.191 Although there has been much debate over whether this 
interconnection between the securities and commodity markets justifies 
consolidated regulation of both markets, political forces have blocked 
efforts to achieve that goal.192 Instead, the two markets have separate and, 
in many cases, quite different regulations.193 For example, there is no 
legislation supporting the development of an NMS in the commodity 
futures markets. The CFTC has not advocated the adoption of such a 
regulatory approach. As a consequence, there is no national market 
                                                                                                                 
 187. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f.  
 188. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Commodity Futures and Exchange-Traded 
Options, 264 Sec. Prac. Portfolio Series (BNA), at A-1 to -8 (2015) (describing the elements of, 
and differences between, futures, options and swap contracts). 
 189. See Markham, supra note 80, at 982 (describing the regulation of futures contracts on 
agricultural commodities).  
 190. James Chen, What is a Derivative?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
ask/answers/12/derivative.asp [https://perma.cc/TY3Q-DBBU] (last updated May 19, 2019). 
 191. See Markham, supra note 80, at 1001 nn.126–27. 
 192. In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department recommended that the CFTC and SEC be 
consolidated into a single agency. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE  11 (2008). The Financial Crisis of 2008 delayed that effort, 
but a Treasury Department report issued in 2009 sought coordinated regulation among financial 
services regulators, particularly the SEC and CFTC. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION 50 (2009). A joint study by the CFTC and the SEC sought to harmonize their 
regulations. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE 
SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION 1–2 (2009). However, the Dodd-Frank 
Act rejected consolidated regulation. Instead, it divided jurisdiction over swaps between the SEC 
and the CFTC. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Swap and Other Over-the-Counter 
Derivative Contracts, 263 Sec. Prac. Portfolio Series (BNA), at A-17 (2014). The SEC was given 
jurisdiction over securities swaps, and the CFTC was given jurisdiction over commodity swaps. 
Id. Joint jurisdiction was given to the SEC and CFTC over “mixed” swaps that had characteristics 
of both securities and commodity swaps. See id. 
 193. See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 CIN. L. 
REV. 537, 544, 548, 552 (2009) (describing those differences and the history between the agencies 
that keep them separate). 
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system for futures trading. Rather, futures and options on particular 
underlying commodities are usually traded on only one exchange.194 
Like the stock exchanges, the commodity futures markets sell non-
core data at prices that are tiered based on the level of access sought by 
traders.195 The greater the access to an exchange’s order-books’ market 
depth, the higher the fees charged by vendors distributing that market data 
and by exchanges for co-location of servers.196 Unlike the SEC, the CFTC 
does not seek to regulate exchange market data fees. Congress amended 
the CEA in 2000 to include a requirement that commodity futures 
exchanges “shall make public daily information on settlement prices, 
volume, open interest, and opening and closing ranges for actively traded 
contracts on the contract market.”197 This required data disclosure is 
principally used to price open positions or inventory at the end of the 
                                                                                                                 
 194. The SEC advocated, as a part of its NMS effort, for the development of common 
clearing and the elimination of exchange rules that curb competition between stock exchanges in 
the same securities. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,596 (June 29, 2005) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). The result has been often fierce competition between 
exchanges. In contrast, commodity futures exchanges generally do not compete with each other 
with respect to particular contracts. See James Chen, Against Actual, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/againstactual.asp [https://perma.cc/794D-J4QW] (last 
updated May 27, 2018). It is a winner-take-all competition, which means, once market share is 
gained, one exchange will own all trading in the contract as long as it is of interest to traders. This 
exchange monopoly has been fostered by the lack of common clearing in the futures industry. The 
Department of Justice has noted: 
[T]he control exercised by futures exchanges over clearing services – including 
(a) where positions in a futures contract are held (“open interest”), and (b) 
whether positions may be treated as fungible or offset with positions held in 
contracts traded on other exchanges (“margin offsets”) – has made it difficult for 
exchanges to enter and compete in the trading of financial futures contracts. If 
greater head-to-head competition for the exchange of futures contracts could 
develop, we would expect it to result in greater innovation in exchange systems, 
lower trading fees, reduced tick size, and tighter spreads, leading to increased 
trading volume. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREAS-DO-2007-0018, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE 1 (2008).  
 195. See, e.g., Licensing Market Data, CME GROUP, https://www.cmegroup.com/market-
data/licensing-market-data.html [https://perma.cc/CNN9-7H5M]. 
 196. See, e.g., How Much Does Market Data Cost and What Data Do I Need?, TRADOVATE, 
https://tradovate.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/115011506088-How-much-does-market-data-
cost-and-what-data-do-I-need- [https://perma.cc/AS59-3PER] (illustrating that Market Depth 
Level 2 Data costs more than Top of Book Level 1 Data).  
 197. Section 7 of Title 7 of the U.S. Code added to the CEA by the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
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trading day.198 It does not provide “non-core” data in the form of depth-
of-order-book pending limit orders.199 More timely, real-time disclosures 
were required by the Dodd–Frank Act200 in 2010 for swaps 
transactions.201  CFTC regulations adopted under that statute require real-
time disclosure of swap transactions and pricing data.202 Nevertheless, 
those rules allow delayed reporting for certain large trades in which 
immediate disclosure could have undue market effects and harm traders 
whose positions would be exposed to other traders.203     
The fact that the CFTC does not regulate exchange fees for exchange 
generated market data makes those fees more susceptible to antitrust 
challenges.204 As is the case for stock exchanges, the federal antitrust 
laws are not explicitly preempted by CFTC regulatory oversight. 
Nevertheless, courts find an implied repeal when necessary, to make the 
CEA work and where the CFTC is actively regulating the subject of an 
antitrust claim.205 The courts have yet to fully assess the application of 
the antitrust laws and the effects of the CFTC’s hands-off approach to 
exchange data fee regulation. In one case, Braman v. CME Group, Inc.,206 
a district court dismissed manipulation and fraud claims brought under 
the CEA, antitrust law, and other laws concerning preferred access for 
HFTs to exchange market data.207 Rather than finding an implied repeal, 
                                                                                                                 
 198. The CFTC is charged with updating net-position-changes data for FCMs. Net Position 
Changes Data, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, https://www.cftc.gov/ 
MarketReports/NetPositionChangesData/index.htm [https://perma.cc/SHC2-59QU].  
 199. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(8) (referencing “settlement prices, volume, open interest, and opening 
and closing ranges” as data that shall be made public, but not non-core data). 
 200. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 
(2012)). 
 201. Id. at 1696. 
 202. 17 C.F.R. § 43.1 (2018). 
 203. 17 C.F.R. § 43.5 (2018); see also Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction 
Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1182, 1184–85 (proposed Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43) 
(explaining that the “market impact” should be considered by the CFTC when setting time delays). 
 204. The CFTC has, however, brought and settled administrative cases charging that futures 
commission merchants (FCMs) improperly calculated the amount of exchange and clearing fees 
that were passed on to the FCMs’ customers. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, CFTC No. 
17-28, 2017 WL 4838599 (Sept. 28, 2017); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., CFTC 
No. 17-25, 2017 WL 4480414 (Sept. 22, 2017); J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, CFTC No. 17-04, 2017 
WL 948842 (Jan. 11, 2017) (respondent failed to pay out some $7 million in exchange fee 
rebates); Barclays Capital, Inc., CFTC No. 16-25, 2016 WL 6522642 (Aug. 4, 2016). 
 205. See, e.g., Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 977 F.2d 1147, 1158 (7th 
Cir. 1992); see also Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 29 (2d Cir. 1985) (failing to 
recognize a repeal of the antitrust laws). 
 206. 149 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 207. Id. at 881. The complaint charged that the exchanges:  
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the antitrust claims were dismissed on the grounds that the complaint’s 
tiered fee claims failed to establish a conspiracy or monopoly that would 
violate the antitrust laws.208 
IV.  THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 
A.  Securities Markets—Background 
The centerpiece of the SEC’s regulatory efforts since the 1960s has 
been its effort to combat trading in publicly traded securities using 
material, nonpublic “inside” information.209 The SEC made this a crime 
through a 1961 administrative consent order styled Cady, Roberts & 
Co.210 The SEC reasoned that traders should have equal access to material 
nonpublic information that could affect stock prices.211 The order further 
stated that traders possessing such information must refrain from trading 
in the affected security until the information is disseminated effectively 
to the marketplace as a whole.212  
Prior to the decision in Cady, Roberts, state courts refused to 
recognize insider trading as a cognizable claim under the common law.213 
As Professor Barbara Bader Aldave has noted, “the majority common law 
rule was that directors and other insiders owed a fiduciary duty to their 
corporation, but not to its shareholders, and that such insiders could trade 
in the corporation's securities without full disclosure.”214 Indeed, a 
leading state law decision dismissing an insider trading claim against 
insiders trading in their company’s stock on the Boston stock exchange 
                                                                                                                 
together with a sophisticated class of technology-driven entities known 
commonly as “high frequency traders” . . . have provided and utilized 
information asymmetry along with clandestine incentive agreements and illegal 
trading practices to create a two-tiered marketplace that disadvantages the 
American public and all other futures marketplace participants, all the while 
continuing to represent to the public and their regulators that they continue to 
provide transparent and fair trading markets to the global market. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Braman v. CME Grp., 
Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-02646)). 
 208. See id. 894–96. 
 209. Markham, supra note 15, at 613–14, 614 n.349. 
 210. Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 211. Id. at *5–6. 
 212. Id. at *5. 
 213. A New York court ruled in 1868 that directors of a corporation owed no duty to disclose 
nonpublic information about their company before buying or selling its stock. See Carpenter v. 
Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 588 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1968). 
 214. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on 
Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 104 & n.21 (1984) (noting that “[i]llustrative 
cases from eighteen states are cited in Chenery Corp v. SEC”) (emphasis added). 
33
Markham: Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to High-Frequen
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
1242 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
was handed down only shortly before the SEC was created in 1934.215 
Consequently, it may be safely assumed that members of Congress were 
on notice that an insider trading prohibition would not be included by 
implication in the federal securities laws on the basis of common law 
fraud standards then existing. Rather, Congress likely concluded that it 
would have to impose such a prohibition expressly in federal legislation, 
if such a prohibition was desired.  
Congress did not include the insider trading prohibition now claimed 
by the SEC in the federal securities laws when those statutes were 
adopted in the 1930s.216 That omission was telling in light of the fact that 
insider trading was criticized in congressional hearings on the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.217 After considering these concerns, Congress 
included only a very narrow insider trading prohibition, instead of the 
broader insider trader prohibition created by the SEC in the Cady, Roberts 
case. That provision is found in § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 
which precludes a narrow range of “insiders,” i.e., officers, directors, and 
shareholders holding more than ten percent of a public company’s stock, 
from making a profit from transactions conducted within six months of 
each other.218 Non-insiders were not subject to this provision, and the 
identified insiders were free to trade for a profit if they had owned their 
company’s stock for more than six months.219  
The scope of the Cady, Roberts insider trading prohibition knows no 
such boundaries. As posited in that decision, anyone, anywhere, commits 
fraud by trading on material, nonpublic “inside” information about a 
public company. Although it recognized that the existing common law on 
insider trading was weighted heavily against creating such a crime, the 
SEC ruled that it was unconstrained by common law fraud concepts.220 
Rather, its opinion asserted that “the securities acts may be said to have 
generated a wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933).  
 216. Congress did not add prohibitions on insider trading until it amended the Securities 
Exchange Act to increase disclosure requirements in 1964. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
467, 78 Stat. 565.  
 217. As Yale Professor William O. Douglas, later SEC chairman and Supreme Court Justice, 
noted in 1934: “Recent court records and Senate hearings are replete with specific and illustrative 
material [involving] . . . trading in securities of the company by virtue of inside 
information. . . . These are not peculiar to recent times. They are forms of business activity long 
known to the law.” William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 
1306 (1934).  
 218. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4–6 
(Nov. 8, 1961).  
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law.”221 Under this uncertain authority, the SEC concluded that its 
antifraud powers should incorporate fiduciary duty concepts to engraft 
insider trading prohibitions into the securities laws.222  
Cady, Roberts cited, as the basis for the creation of its “classical” 
insider trading prohibition, the “inherent unfairness involved where a 
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to 
those with whom he is dealing.”223 This claim of “unfairness” would 
seemingly apply to HFTs trading on nonpublic information that is, as a 
practical matter, available only to a limited number of such traders. 
Surely, it is no less unfair to allow HFTs, with their already inherent time 
and place advantages, to trade on restricted data than it is to allow 
corporate insiders to trade. 
The Second Circuit generally approved of the insider trading theory 
created by the SEC in Cady, Roberts in a high-profile case involving the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company.224 The Supreme Court, however, 
subsequently tried to limit the reach of this administratively invented 
crime by requiring proof that the defendant had some duty to maintain 
the confidentiality of the information.225 The Court stated that “a duty to 
disclose . . . does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information.”226 “Moreover, neither the Congress nor the [Securities and 
Exchange] Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule. 
Instead the problems caused by misuse of market information have been 
addressed by detailed and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when 
use of market information may not harm operation of the securities 
markets.”227  
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, left open doors that allowed the 
SEC to effectively apply its insider trading theory to a very broad range 
of cases. In United States v. O’Hagan,228 the Supreme Court concluded 
that it would recognize two forms of insider trading: (1) “classical” 
insider trading by a corporate official as in the Cady, Roberts case, and 
(2) the “misappropriation” of inside information by third parties.229 In 
Dirks v. SEC,230 the Supreme Court further held that someone tipped on 
inside information (a “tippee”) by a corporate official (the “tipper”) could 
be liable for inside trading if the tipper received some benefit from the 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Id. at *3.  
 222. See id. at *4–6. 
 223. Id. at *4.  
 224. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 225. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–35 (1980). 
 226. Id. at 235. 
 227. Id. at 233.  
 228. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  
 229. Id. at 652. 
 230. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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trading.231 That decision was premised on the somewhat strained theory 
that the tippee in such instances inherited the fiduciary duty of the tipper 
to keep such information confidential.232 
B.  Securities Markets—“Classical” Theory for Insider Trading 
The “classical” theory of insider trading by corporate officers using 
nonpublic information about their company is premised on the agency’s 
view that such trading is a breach of those individuals’ fiduciary duty to 
their corporate shareholders.233 As noted above, however, prior to the 
adoption of the antifraud provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, on which the SEC’s insider trading claims are premised, state 
courts had generally ruled that fiduciary duties did not create a basis for 
insider trading liability.234  
The Supreme Court decisions adopting the SEC’s insider trading 
claims have mixed the distinction between a breach of fiduciary duty and 
the commission of fraud. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is 
an antifraud statute.235 A breach of fiduciary duties, as New York Court 
of Appeals Justice Benjamin Cardozo famously asserted in Meinhard v. 
Salmon,236 is not dependent on a showing the elements of fraud, such as 
fraudulent intent. In Meinhard, the court found a breach of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty even though there was “no thought to hold that Salmon 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. at 661–62. The Supreme Court later clarified that the benefit to the tipper need not 
be substantial and that a personal relationship would justify the finding of an indirect benefit. 
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016). 
 232. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
 233. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 234. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. To be sure, the Supreme Court held in 
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), that there may be some unusual, special facts that may 
have to be disclosed by insiders trading in their company’s stock. Id. at 431–34 (holding that 
insiders having nonpublic information that increased the value of the stock of a company by ten 
times current trading prices required disclosure). After the SEC’s announcement of its new insider 
trading rule in the Cady, Roberts & Co. case, the New York Court of Appeals held in Diamond v. 
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969), that trading on inside information was a breach of 
fiduciary duty on the part of corporate employees engaging in such activity. Id. at 914. The New 
York court in that opinion expressly recognized the right of action created by the SEC under 
Section 10(b) and incorporated it into New York law as a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 914–15. 
That decision was followed by some other states. See, e.g., In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 
1449, 1458 (D.N.J. 1987); Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 840 (Del. 2011). 
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, declined to follow the “innovative ruling” of the New 
York Court in Diamond. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975). The Seventh Circuit 
followed the Florida decision in considering the scope of Indiana law on this subject. Freeman v. 
Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 235. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934 [https://perma.cc/95S6-WT9D]. 
 236. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
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was guilty of a conscious purpose to defraud” and that “[v]ery likely” he 
was acting in “good faith.”237   
The Supreme Court did, however, recognize a distinction between the 
elements required to establish fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the lower standards adopted by courts for 
fiduciary duty violations. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,238 the Court 
held that Section 10(b) is a fraud standard that requires “intentional or 
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors.”239 The 
Supreme Court went further in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,240 
rejecting a claim that SEC Rule 10b-5 brought “within the ambit of the 
Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities 
transaction.”241 The Court further stated that “the claim of fraud and 
fiduciary duty breach in the complaint states a cause of action under any 
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 
‘manipulative or deceptive’ within the meaning of the statute.”242 Of 
course, insider trading does not fairly fall within those terms because, 
when Section 10(b) was enacted, such activities were not viewed to be 
manipulative or deceptive, or even breaches of fiduciary duties.   
The Supreme Court partially set aside those principles when it 
considered the application of Rule 10b-5 to the classical theory of insider 
trading in Chiarella v. United States.243 There, the Court held that a duty 
of disclosure would arise under common law where there was “a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them.”244 In finding such a fiduciary duty on the part of corporate insiders 
to anonymous purchasers of their company’s stock, the Court cited the 
SEC’s Cady, Roberts decision.245 That administrative settlement order, 
however, had simply made up that duty, ignoring the long-standing 
precedent holding there was no such duty. To the extent that Congress 
wanted to prohibit insider trading, it distinctly limited such a restriction 
to officers, directors, and ten-percent shareholders making profits from 
trading in their company’s stock within a six-month period.246  
                                                                                                                 
 237. Id. at 548. 
 238. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 239. Id. at 199.  See generally Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 200 (1992) (describing the development of fiduciary 
duty concepts at common law and their application to federal laws). 
 240. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 241. Id. at 472–74. 
 242. Id. at 473–74. 
 243. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 244. Id. at 227–28 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 
1976)). 
 245. Id. at 226–27. 
 246. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012). 
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The Court in Chiarella rejected a claim of insider trading under 
Section 10(b) where a printer traded on information he discovered while 
typesetting disclosure documents that were to be filed with the SEC.247 
The Chiarella decision noted that at common law a failure to disclose 
material nonpublic information arose only where there was a duty to 
disclose.248 Chiarella had no such duty.249 The Court declined to consider 
whether the misappropriation of inside information would violate the 
Securities Exchange Act because that issue had not been properly raised 
in the lower courts.250   
In another case, Carpenter v. United States,251 the Supreme Court was 
evenly divided on whether insider trading on misappropriated 
information violated the federal securities laws.252 In a unanimous 
opinion holding that such conduct violated mail and wire fraud statutes, 
the Court cited the New York state court opinion in Diamond v. 
Oreamuno253 as authority for its recognition of insider trading as the basis 
for mail and wire fraud charges.254 The New York court in Diamond 
relied on the Cady, Roberts decision in reaching its “innovative ruling,” 
which was rejected by state courts that chose to follow common law 
precedents rejecting such claims.255  
In contrast to the broad reach sought by the SEC in its Cady, Roberts 
decision, under Chiarella and Carpenter, outsiders legally gaining 
knowledge of inside information could trade on such an information 
disparity even if that trading was unfair to other traders. For example, a 
famous football coach who overheard a conversation disclosing inside 
information while he was sunbathing in a university grandstand could 
legally trade on that information.256 In contrast, a psychiatrist trading on 
inside information learned from a patient violated Section 10(b) because 
he breached a fiduciary duty of confidentiality owed to the patient.257 A 
                                                                                                                 
 247. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224–25. 
 248. Id. at 227–28. 
 249. See id. at 235. 
 250. Id. at 239. 
 251. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 252. Id. at 27–28. As described below, the Supreme Court later concluded in O’Hagan that 
misappropriation violated Section 10(b). See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997). 
 253. 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).  
 254. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27–28. 
 255. Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 914.  Courts applying Indiana and Florida laws and precedent 
have declined to follow this “innovative ruling.” See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th 
Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975). 
 256. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (explaining that a football 
coach who inadvertently overheard information at a track meet was not barred from trading on 
that information under Rule 10b-5). 
 257. United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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logical distinction between these two cases is missing; the injury suffered 
by the traders buying the stock in both cases is identical, but only one set 
of traders has a cognizable claim for redress.258  
This conversion of a fiduciary duty into a fraud claim becomes even 
more convoluted when applied to “tippees,” i.e., persons receiving 
nonpublic information from a corporate insider. The SEC claimed that it 
was unfair to allow those traders to benefit from nonpublic information 
at the expense of others.259 The Supreme Court limited the scope of that 
administratively invented extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in 
Dirks v. SEC. There, Raymond Dirks was tipped by an insider about a 
massive fraud scheme that was inflating the value of a company’s 
stock.260 Dirks, an investment adviser, was following the company on 
behalf of his clients.261 Those clients sold some $16 million of their stock 
in the company before the fraud was publicized.262  Even though Dirks 
had not traded for his own account, the SEC charged him with insider 
trading because he had tipped his clients on the fraud.263 The SEC 
contended that “anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material 
information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before 
trading.”264 The Supreme Court held, however, that the mere receipt of 
information from an insider does not create such a special relationship 
between the tippee and the corporation’s shareholders.265  
The Court in Dirks gave general approval to the Cady, Roberts 
opinion but reiterated its holding in the Chiarella case, i.e., that Section 
10(b) does not require equal information among all traders.266 Rather, 
there must be some duty to disclose imposed on the tippee through the 
tipper.267 This will occur where the disclosure is in breach of the tipper’s 
fiduciary duty.268 The Court in Dirks ruled that such a breach occurs 
where the insider, viz., the tipper, will benefit directly or indirectly from 
                                                                                                                 
 258. Id.  
 259. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983). 
 260. Id. at 649. 
 261. See id.  
 262. Id. Dirks had tried to alert the SEC and the Wall Street Journal on the fraud, but that 
newspaper was skeptical of the claim and refused to publish an article on it until trading in the 
company’s stock was halted. See id. at 649–50; Fred Barbash, SEC Censure of Dirks Overturned, 
WASH. POST (July 2, 1983), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1983/07/02/sec-
censure-of-dirks-overturned/b4ffff77-cb79-4432-857e-8d453a306eb8/?utm_term=.03b87d54ac26 
[https://perma.cc/243V-6SSJ]. 
 263. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650–51. 
 264. Id. at 656. 
 265. Id. at 656 n.15. 
 266. Id. at 655–59.  
 267. See id. at 657–58. 
 268. See id. at 659. 
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the disclosure because “absent a breach by the insider, there is no 
derivative breach.”269 The Court stated that such a breach could occur 
where a gift of confidential information is given to a friend or relative, 
because it would be the equivalent of trading by the insider and then 
giving the profits to the friend or relative.270  
The non-core market data sold by the exchanges to the HFTs is 
nonpublic material information with which HFTs are tipped in exchange 
for fees. Nevertheless, the SEC has allowed the exchanges to sell this 
information to HFTs on a preferred basis, which conflicts with the action 
taken by the SEC in the wake of the Dirks case. There, the Court noted 
the importance of the role of investment advisers in ferreting out 
information by meeting individually with corporate officers or others 
who have inside information.271 “It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information 
cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s 
stockholders or the public generally.”272 
The Court refused to hold Dirks liable as an insider when he tipped 
his clients with inside information.273 Despite that ruling, the SEC refused 
to drop its Cady, Roberts mandate of equal access to nonpublic 
information after losing on that issue in Dirks. Instead, the SEC 
promulgated Regulation FD (Regulation Fair Disclosure).274 That 
regulation prohibits the officers of public companies from making 
selective disclosures of company matters to financial analysts, 
institutional investors, or other traders.275 Such officers may discuss 
company operations only with an analyst and only in meetings open to 
all analysts.276 This restriction was intended to prevent traders, like Dirks, 
from receiving selective disclosures that allow them to get a jump on 
other traders.277 In adopting Regulation FD, the SEC stated that “to the 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Id. at 662.  
 270. Id. at 664. In a subsequent case, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016), the 
Supreme Court held that the benefit bestowed on the tipper needed to establish tippee liability for 
a friend or relative tipped on inside information need not be direct or “pecuniary or similarly 
valuable in nature.” Id. at 425 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014), 
abrogated in part by Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428). 
 271. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 665. 
 274. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2018).   
 275. See id.  
 276. See Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7887, Exchange 
Act Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 1999 WL 1217849 
(proposed Dec. 19, 2000). 
 277. See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair 
Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 11 (2005) (discussing application of 
Regulation FD). 
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maximum extent practicable, [we believe that all investors should] have 
access to an issuer’s material disclosures at the same time.”278 This was 
viewed to be a matter of “fundamental fairness to all investors.”279 The 
SEC further stated that  
Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in 
this regard to ordinary “tipping” and insider trading. In both 
cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge – and the 
ability to use that edge to profit – from their superior access 
to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or 
diligence.280  
This concern would seemingly apply to non-core exchange data sold 
selectively to HFTs. The tiered pricing for that information effectively 
denies access by other traders to such data on a timely basis. As the SEC 
stated with respect to Regulation FD: 
Although the antifraud provisions of the securities laws 
do not require that all traders possess equal information 
when they trade, we believe that our disclosure rules should 
promote fair treatment of large and small investors by, 
among other things, giving all investors timely access to 
material information an issuer chooses to disclose.281 
C.  Commodity Markets—“Classical” Insider Trading Claims Rejected 
Inside information in the commodity markets takes many forms. For 
example, businesses use these markets to hedge themselves against 
commercial price risks. These risks may flow from the loss of value in an 
existing inventory or from the risk of price increases in inventory yet to 
be acquired.282 Hedgers are often large commercial firms that have 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Paul S. Maco, Dir., Office of Mun. Sec., SEC, Remarks before the Joint Annual 
Conference of the National Council of Health Facilities Authorities and the National Association 
of Higher Education Facilities Authorities (Sept. 13, 2000). 
 279. Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7887, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 1999 WL 1217849 (proposed 
Dec. 19, 2000). 
 280. Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 2000 WL 1201556 (Aug. 15, 
2000). 
 281. Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7887, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 1999 WL 1217849 (proposed 
Dec. 19, 2000). 
 282. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982) 
(describing how hedging provides “well-recognized benefits” to commercial firms). 
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nonpublic information concerning their own purchasing or selling plans 
that may have a market effect.283 
Despite such informational advantages, commodity futures traders 
have not been saddled with the insider trading prohibition invented by the 
SEC in Cady, Roberts. The Supreme Court rejected such an approach 
over two hundred years ago in Laidlaw v. Organ.284 Writing for the Court 
there, Chief Justice John Marshall held that a purchaser of tobacco had 
no duty to disclose to the seller the buyer’s prior nonpublic knowledge of 
the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.285 The public announcement of that 
treaty subsequently caused a significant rise in tobacco prices.286  
The CFTC has also heretofore rejected the SEC’s approach to insider 
trading. Shortly after it was created, the CFTC conducted a study on 
insider trading in the commodity markets. The resulting report found that, 
like HFTs given privileged access to exchange market data: “[T]raders 
on the floor of an exchange may have advantages of time and place over 
others. Such access to superior or more timely information is inherent in 
the markets, and futures market participants voluntarily accept this 
situation if they choose to trade.”287 
The CFTC noted in that report that, in one instance, the chief 
economist for a large trading firm publicly announced “his forecast that 
interest rates would fall.”288 That announcement had a strong market 
effect on futures prices.289 Prior to the announcement, the economist’s 
                                                                                                                 
 283. Hedge Fund Operational Due Diligence Education Series – Understanding Material 
Nonpublic Information in the United States, CORGENTUM, https://www.corgentum.com/research/ 
hedge-fund-operational-due-diligence-material-nonpublic-information-united-states.html 
[https://perma.cc/PH6F-NH8M]; Hedgers & Speculators, DANIELS TRADING, https://www.daniel 
strading.com/education/futures-options-101/hedges-speculators [https://perma.cc/755N-EAMN]. 
 284. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 193 (1817). 
 285. Id. at 195. 
 286. Id. at 184–86, 193. In rejecting that claim, Justice Marshall’s opinion stated that:  
 The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, 
which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively 
within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him 
to the vendor? The court is of the opinion that he was not bound to communicate 
it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, 
where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. But at the 
same time, each party must take care not to say or do anything tending to impose 
upon the other. 
Id. at 195. 
 287. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, A STUDY OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND 
EFFECTS OF FUTURES TRADING BY PERSONS POSSESSING MATERIAL, NONPUBLIC INFORMATION 54–
55 (1984). 
 288. Id. at 42. 
 289. Id. at 42–43. 
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firm purchased several million dollars of futures contracts on financial 
instruments that profited from the market effect of his prediction.290 In 
the securities industry, such practices may be deemed a violation of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.291 Nevertheless, 
the CFTC’s insider trading report concluded that an inside trading 
prohibition in the form of the classical theory adopted by the SEC was 
unnecessary in the futures markets.292  
Congress confirmed the CFTC’s approach to insider trading on 
commodity futures exchanges when it amended the CEA in 2008. That 
amendment added a proviso to the antifraud provisions of § 6b of the 
CEA,293 which states that § 6b’s prohibitions do not require disclosure of 
“nonpublic information that may be material to the market price, rate, or 
level of the commodity or transaction, except as necessary to make any 
statement made to the other person in or in connection with the 
transaction not misleading in any material respect.”294   
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 (Dodd–Frank Act) added to the CEA language taken from 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This was the 
statute that the SEC had used to create its insider trading prohibition.295 
That language was borrowed to better prosecute price manipulation 
schemes under the CEA.296 Congress made clear, however, that this 
amendment did not create an insider trading prohibition under the CEA. 
This was accomplished by adding the same language that was included 
in the 2008 CEA amendments, which adopted the approach taken in the 
Laidlaw case for insider trading in commodities.  
The CFTC subsequently announced that it is permissible under the 
Dodd–Frank amendment for traders “to withhold information that a 
market participant lawfully possesses about market conditions . . . either 
                                                                                                                 
 290. Id. at 43.  
 291. In Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), the Court held that a financial 
columnist could violate Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act by purchasing stock before 
publishing an article that would cause a rise in the stock’s value and then selling the stock for a 
profit, a practice known as “scalping.” Id. at 1267; see Bruce A. Kohn, Note, The First Amendment 
and “Scalping” by a Financial Columnist: May a Newspaper Article Be Commercial Speech?, 
57 IND. L.J. 131, 131 (1982); see also Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (explaining the facts and significance of Zweig). 
 292. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 287, at 59 
 293. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2012). 
 294. Id. § 6b(b). 
 295. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 296. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 753, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1750 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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in an anonymous market setting or in bilateral negotiations.”297 The 
CFTC thus recognized “that unlike securities markets, derivatives 
markets have long operated in a way that allows for market participants 
to trade on the basis of lawfully obtained material nonpublic 
information.”298   
Despite these limitations on insider trading prohibitions, the CEA and 
CFTC regulations prohibit exchange officials from trading on inside 
information obtained in their roles as self-regulators.299 This raises the 
issue of whether the exchange is “tipping” other traders, i.e., the 
exchanges giving HFTs nonpublic information before other traders for 
fees. In one case, the CFTC charged that an exchange was responsible for 
the leaks of nonpublic information about the orders of other traders by an 
employee to a third-party trader in exchange for entertainment 
expenses.300 A district court refused to dismiss those charges.301  
D.  Insider Trading—Misappropriation and Front Running 
Although Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is an antifraud 
standard, it was never intended to be an all-purpose statute to attack fraud 
everywhere for anything even remotely related to a security.302 Rather, it 
is a term of art addressed to manipulative activities that affect securities 
prices.303 Of course, as a commodity, proprietary material nonpublic 
information should be protected from theft.304 However, theft was already 
covered by the mail and wire fraud statutes before the new crime of 
insider trading was invented under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
                                                                                                                 
 297. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,402 (July 14, 
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180). 
 298. Id. at 41,403. 
 299. 7 U.S.C. § 13(e); 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(b)(1)(i) (2018). 
 300. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Byrnes, 58 F. Supp. 3d 319, 320–21 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 301. Id. at 320. 
 302. See Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (noting how 
the plaintiff must be the purchaser or seller of a security where fraud under Section 10b is 
claimed). 
 303. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). 
 304. Ironically, the SEC was itself subject to a massive misappropriation of material 
nonpublic information from its confidential files. A group of hackers stole the information and 
used it to make large profits by trading in stocks of companies filing financial reports with the 
SEC before those reports were made publicly available. Dave Michaels & Gabriel T. Rubin, How 
to Make Money Trading: Hack Into SEC, Peek at 157 Secret Earnings Reports, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
15, 2019, 7:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/overseas-trader-network-charged-with-
hacking-secs-corporate-filing-trove-11547562262 [https://perma.cc/LF2N-JDDE]. 
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Exchange Act.305 Nevertheless, the SEC’s misappropriation theory of 
insider trading under Section 10(b) was recognized by the Supreme Court 
in its O’Hagan decision.306  
The CFTC initially rejected the adoption of a misappropriation theory. 
In its 1984 report on inside trading in the futures markets, the CFTC 
stated that: 
[I]t is not always clear who is injured by such trading. 
One of the parties injured by the misappropriation of 
information, the source of the information, may not even 
trade in the futures markets although that party’s cash market 
positions could be affected indirectly. In addition, the party 
transacting with the insider may claim harm by his or her 
lack of access to the nonpublic information.307 
“Front running” is a form of misappropriation.308 This practice 
involves the use of advance knowledge of pending or proposed orders of 
other traders that will have market effects and from which the front runner 
can profit.309 The concern, in the context of privileged access to exchange 
order-book data by HFTs, is that such access allows HFTs to trade in 
front of other traders who do not have equal access. HFT algorithms can 
also use order-book data to ferret out the trading patterns of other traders 
and to profit from that knowledge.310 As one complaint alleged, preferred 
access to exchange market data:  
provided HFT firms with virtually exclusive access to 
detailed trading data in time to “front-run” other market 
participants by anticipating large pending transactions, 
                                                                                                                 
 305. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (considering both mail and wire 
fraud claims and misappropriation under Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act). 
 306. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–54 (1997).  
 307. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 287, at 57. 
 308. See, e.g., What Is Front Running?, CFI, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/ 
resources/knowledge/trading-investing/front-running/ [https://perma.cc/R3XG-8WWN] (“Front 
running is considered a form of market manipulation and insider trading because a person who 
commits a front running activity expects security’s price movements based on the non-public 
information.”); see also COVINGTON & BURLING, CFTC ENFORCEMENT OUTLOOK: INSIDER 
TRADING 2–4 (2016), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2016/10/cftc_ 
enforcement_outlook_insider_trading.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X45-UB6A] (discussing the 
misappropriation theory and derivatives markets). 
 309. See City of Providence v. BATS Glob. Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(describing front running claims involving advanced access by HFTs to exchange market data), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 341 (2018). 
 310. See Shobbit Seth, The World of High Frequency Algorithmic Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/091615/world-high-frequency-algorithmic-
trading.asp [https://perma.cc/J6FC-U563] (last updated May 19, 2019). 
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buying and driving up the prices for the stocks before those 
orders were placed, and forcing investors to pay more for 
those stocks than they otherwise would have.311 
The CFTC has, over the years, brought a handful of cases involving 
front running of customer orders and there have been a couple of criminal 
cases involving such claims.312 Front running claims have typically 
involved a broker trading ahead of its own customers or employees 
trading on market moving trading plans of their employer.313 HFTs are 
not trading in front of their customers. Rather, they are trading in front 
of, or taking advantage of, independent traders. As an SEC Commissioner 
has noted, “[t]he HFT firm ‘has no preexisting relationship with the trader 
placing the order that the HFT detects,’ which means that the HFT firm 
is not breaking any duty to the other trader.”314 Of course, the same is true 
of classical insider trading where the person buying from, or selling to, 
the insider generally has no preexisting relationship with the insider. 
Although the CFTC was prohibited from adopting a classical theory 
of insider trading by Dodd–Frank and earlier 2008 legislation,315 it 
continued to press for a front running prohibition in Rule 180.1, adopted 
after Dodd–Frank.316 In adopting the rule, the CFTC stated that Rule 
180.1 may prohibit “trading on the basis of material nonpublic 
information in breach of a pre-existing duty (established by another law 
or rule, agreement, understanding, or some other source).”317 It also 
prohibited trading on the basis of “material nonpublic information that 
was obtained through fraud or deception.”318 This seems to adopt a 
                                                                                                                 
 311. BATS Glob. Mkts., 878 F.3d at 49. 
 312. See generally United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding mail and 
wire fraud convictions where brokers breached fiduciary duty to customers by trading ahead of 
their orders); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kelly, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,465 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (entering a CFTC injunctive action with a criminal prosecution for front running 
employer’s orders); In re Ruggles, CFTC No. 16-34, [2016–2017 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,872 (Sept. 29, 2016) (entering a consent order for front running); In re 
Motazedi, CFTC No. 16-02, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,599 
(Dec. 2, 2015) (entering a consent order for front running). 
 313. See, e.g., Dial, 757 F.2d at 168. 
 314. Peirce, supra note 13, at 350 (quoting Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market; 
Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 227 (2015)). 
 315. See supra notes 293–97 and accompanying text. 
 316. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2018). 
 317. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,430 (July 14, 
2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180); see Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities 
Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 447, 464–65 (2016) (discussing this rule and conducting a comparative 
analysis of insider trading prohibitions in the securities and commodities markets). 
 318. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,403.  
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misappropriation theory for insider trading in the futures markets despite 
the rejection of such a prohibition in the agency’s 1984 insider trading 
report.319 
The CFTC seems poised to expand its enforcement of Rule 180.1. In 
2018, the CFTC created a new “Insider Trading and Information 
Protection Task Force,” which will prosecute misappropriation of 
confidential information, front running, and unauthorized disclosures of 
information about customer trading.320 The reference to “Insider 
Trading” in the title of this task force suggests that the CFTC is seeking 
to gain some of the spotlight obtained by the SEC in the press through the 
invention of the crime of insider trading. Whatever the case, it is unlikely 
that the CFTC will claim that the privileged data fee arrangements for 
HFTs will constitute front running or misappropriation of customer 
information. To do so would expand insider trading prohibitions even 
beyond the SEC’s positions on the subject.   
V.  EXCHANGE MARKET DATA FEES SHOULD NOT BE REGULATED 
The SEC’s law against insider trading suffers from the fact that the 
agency administratively created this crime on the premise that unequal 
access to information is unfair to other traders. As a result, prohibited 
insider trading has no real definition beyond what the SEC or a court may 
say it is on any given day. Claims brought by traders against exchanges 
giving HFTs unequal access to market data are premised on this 
unfairness theory wrapped in the cloak of fiduciary duties. The SEC 
resisted applying insider trading prohibitions to the sale of this data, but 
has reversed course on deferring to market forces to regulate associated 
fees.321 This seems to signal an effort to continue to regulate such fees 
through public utility-like proceedings. The SEC’s announcement of its 
pilot program to measure the effects of transaction fees on market 
efficiency322 will undoubtedly raise the unfairness issue, i.e., the SEC will 
be asked to regulate exchange fees and rebates in ways that will reduce 
this “unfairness” to other traders.  
Critics of HFTs having privileged access to market data, particularly 
non-core data, will continue to attack tiered fees for that data on the 
ground that it allows HFTs to front run the orders of other traders. The 
CFTC’s new “Insider Trading and Information Protection Task Force” 
will also be tempted and pressured to create novel theories that will attack 
                                                                                                                 
 319. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
 320. Katherine Berk, The CFTC Pushes into New Insider Trading Terrain, COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. ONLINE (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:59 AM), https://cblr.columbia.edu/the-cftc-pushes-into-new-
insider-trading-terrain/ [https://perma.cc/PGM7-N49R]. 
 321. See supra Section IV.C. 
 322. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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the HFTs’ order detection algorithms, which rely on privileged market 
data access as a form of front running.   
Hopefully, the SEC and CFTC will resist efforts to subject exchange 
market data fees to the “unfairness” theory on which insider trading 
prohibitions are premised. Exchange market data is simply a commodity 
that has value to its proprietor, i.e., the exchange. As a commodity, 
information has value that, when brought to market, should reward the 
person possessing and transmitting it to market faster than other traders 
through a better price received for order executions. This is not a one-
sided bargain. The rapid introduction of new information by traders 
motivated to bring the information to market creates market efficiency 
benefits.  
Nonpublic information has been used to gain profits in the commodity 
markets for over two centuries, as illustrated by the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Laidlaw v. Organ.323 The SEC should 
acknowledge what the Supreme Court recognized in Laidlaw: There 
should be no duty imposed to assure that counterparties have access to 
nonpublic information.324 That is the rule in the futures markets. In other 
words, unequal access to information is not unfair. Rather, trading on 
such information assures faster, more efficient pricing because the 
possessor will have a profit incentive to bring this information to the 
market. Prices will respond to the signals emitted by the trader buying or 
selling on the basis of the nonpublic information. Market efficiency 
outweighs concerns with unfairness to other traders in the commodity 
markets, and that should be the case for the securities markets.  
This is not a radical concept. Commodities may be marketed in a 
variety of ways that provide differing levels of access or service to 
purchasers of commodities. For example, Amazon offers premium 
delivery services for a fee.325  Information, in particular, is often sold at 
prices that vary based on the speed and nature of the access being sold. 
Look no further than your most recent hotel stay, where you may have 
been given the choice of free Internet, which is slow, or faster Internet for 
a fee.326 Cable television subscribers are also provided varying levels of 
                                                                                                                 
 323. See 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 184–86 (1817). 
 324. See id. at 195. 




 326. See, e.g., Member Benefits, HILTON, https://hiltonhonors3.hilton.com/en/explore/ 
benefits/index.html [https://perma.cc/B43B-SRGY] (offering free wi-fi to persons frequently 
staying at a Hilton hotel). 
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service and are charged based on the information content and level they 
want to access.327 
The SEC has modified its approach to inside information with respect 
to non-core market data fees by allowing privileged access to be sold to 
a select group of traders, i.e., HFTs. Nevertheless, its penchant for 
regulating the flow of information in the securities markets continues. 
Initially, the SEC deferred to exchange competition to regulate the 
amounts of fees for non-core market data.328 This meant that non-core 
market data could be sold to the highest bidders, viz., the HFTs. The 
HFTs, however, contend that the exchanges are overcharging for this 
information and have appealed to the SEC to regulate the amounts of 
those fees. As described above, the SEC’s hands-off approach to 
exchange fees was successfully challenged in a circuit court, which found 
that the SEC’s economic approach to the fairness of the fees lacked 
rigorous application.329 Afterwards, and as a result of provisions in the 
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, the SEC began taking a more proactive 
approach in finding exchange fees to be excessive.330   
In the meantime, traders suffering from the privileged access to non-
core data sold to HFTs are claiming that this access is unfair and have 
made fraud and other claims challenging this access.331 The courts are 
still sorting out the validity of such claims. Whatever the outcome of 
future challenges to the SEC’s utility-like regulation over exchange 
market data fees, issues and claims of unfairness will continue. The 
ultimate question that needs to be answered is simply whether exchanges 
should make available such material nonpublic information for sale to the 
highest bidder. That question has been addressed and answered by 
Congress in the commodity futures markets, where the CEA rejected 
unfairness claims relating to unequal access to nonpublic information. 
The CFTC has been precluded by statute from restricting trading on 
inside information even if that information may have a market effect on 
commodity futures prices.332  
On the other side of the coin, public utility-like regulation should not 
protect HFTs from high fees. If the fees are too high, the HFTs can exit 
                                                                                                                 
 327. See, e.g., Xfinity Subscription Packages, COMCAST, https://www.xfinity.com/ 
learn/digital-cable-tv/svod [https://perma.cc/AQ49-4P79] (describing several subscription on-
demand packages). 
 328. See supra Section IV.C. 
 329. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Morgenson, supra note 6. 
 331. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. See generally Chi. Bd. Options Exch. 
v. SEC, 889 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming a decision by the SEC in which the court deferred 
to the SEC’s conclusion that the agency did not have jurisdiction to hear claims by broker–dealers 
seeking an accounting and damages from exchanges charging improper fees). 
 332. Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2012)). 
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the market and seek or create alternative trading venues or seek protection 
under the antitrust laws if the exchanges exercise their monopoly power 
improperly. That ability gives large institutional traders tremendous 
bargaining power. As it is now, the HFTs are gaming the exchanges by 
using the SEC as their tool to reduce exchange fees. Apparently frustrated 
by that delayed process, HFTs are formulating competitive threats to the 
exchanges that seek a reduction in fees. As noted above, that effort 
includes the creation of competing exchanges.333 That competition should 
be allowed to proceed. It will provide a real market test for keeping 
market data fees reasonable through competition.  
CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s development of the NMS was premised on the ability of 
stockbrokers to readily access core data to fulfill their NMS customer 
order execution responsibilities. The SEC initially deferred to the market 
in setting the levels for those fees, i.e., the agency allowed competition 
among exchanges and other trading venues for volume to assure that high 
fees did not effectively bar brokers’ access to that data. The SEC has now 
reversed that approach, holding that the exchanges have not shown that 
market forces were adequate to assure fair and reasonable fees. In taking 
this action, the SEC is trying to act as a referee in the fight over data fees 
between SIFMA members and the stock exchanges. In carrying out this 
role, the SEC has switched from one side to the other without any real 
economic support for its positions. At the same time, the SEC has left the 
investing public to the tender mercies of the HFTs in their preferred 
access to non-core data. The effect of this two-tiered approach is that the 
SEC is fostering an unlevel playing field on dubious policy grounds.  
                                                                                                                 
 333. See supra notes 52, 166 and accompanying text. An existing exchange is also competing 
on fees and to operate its systems in a way that lessens the trading advantages of HFTs. See 
Morgenson, supra note 6; see also Cezary Podkul, Study Finds ‘Speed Bumps’ Help Protect 
Ordinary Investors, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2018, 7:00 AM),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/study-
finds-speed-bumps-help-protect-ordinary-investors-1528974002  [https://perma.cc/UUC3-L98S] 
(describing IEX’s effort to equalize market access for all traders). The SEC also approved a pilot 
program by an exchange that slows down order entry (speed bump) to remove or reduce latency 
advantages of HFTs. Chi. Stock Exch., Pilot Program Approved for LEAD Speed Bump, MEDIUM 
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/@TradeOnCHX/pilot-program-approved-for-lead-speed-
bump-9954c01a2926 [https://perma.cc/8Z88-SLS3]; see also Markham, supra note 15, at 612–
13 (describing other efforts to slow the HFTs’ ability to formulate and enter orders faster than 
other traders). Competition with exchange fees is also arriving from “single dealer” based 
exchanges in which a large financial institution acts as the counterparty to clients that are buying 
and selling stocks. Alexander Osipovich, After Job Cuts, Deutsche Bank Plans New Electronic 
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The SEC could, of course, double down and start regulating non-core 
data fees and exchange rebates.334 This would lessen the disparity of 
access to the extent that smaller traders may be better able to afford 
reduced fees for this data. This access would not, however, remove the 
speed advantage of the HFTs’ computerized algorithmic trading and their 
use of high-speed lines and other modern communication advances. 
Moreover, the large financial institutions that SIFMA represents do not 
need the SEC’s assistance in bargaining for lower fees. The SEC is, in 
any event, ill-equipped for its role of setting fees for market data. That 
public-utility style regulation should be abandoned in favor of the forces 
of market competition. This competition is now arriving in the guise of 
new exchanges that are forming to challenge data fees. In the meantime, 
if the current exchanges are using their monopoly power to exact 
unreasonable fees, the antitrust laws will provide adequate protection, 
especially if the securities laws are deemed not to impliedly repeal those 
statutes. 
                                                                                                                 
 334. In March 2019, the SEC announced that it was reviewing the multi-tier pricing and 
rebate programs now used by the exchanges. The SEC study will seek to determine whether those 
arrangements are placing smaller traders at an unfair advantage.  John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC 
Scrutinizes Fairness of Exchange Pricing, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2019, 1:43 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-exchanges-fees-exclusive/exclusive-sec-scrutinizes-fair 
ness-of-stock-exchange-pricing-idUSKCN1QO2CY [https://perma.cc/B6YR-WJE3]. The SEC 
chairman also revealed that the agency would be seeking to speed up dissemination of core data 
as a means for reducing the disparity of access to market data. Gabriel T. Rubin & Alexander 
Osipovich, SEC Chief Wants Smaller Investors to Have Better, Faster Stock Data, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chief-wants-smaller-investors-to-have-better-faster-stock-
data-11552052700 [https://perma.cc/UJ6L-YLLV] (last updated Mar. 8, 2019, 2:03 PM). 
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